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THE POLITICS OF NONACQUIESCENCE: THE
LEGACY OF STIEBERGER v. SULLIVAN*
INTRODUCTION

In 1978, Theresa Stieberger missed an appointment with a
Social Security Administration ("SSA") consulting examiner
because her son was ill.' In response, the SSA immediately
terminated the Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits
she had been receiving for four years.' After her 1983 reapplication for SSI and Social Security disability insurance ("SSDI")
benefits' was denied and her administrative remedies ex-

* Stieberger v. Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (settlement order)
[hereinafter Stieberger Settlement], modified by 801 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
Stieberger v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (motion for summary
judgment) [hereinafter Stieberger III]; Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.
1986) [hereinafter Stieberger I1; Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (motion for injunctive relief) [hereinafter Stieberger I].
Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1323.
2 Id. The Social Security Administration ("SSA") terminated Stieberger's Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits without a pretermination evidentiary
hearing pursuant to Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), which held that
such hearings are not required by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Eight years later, Congress passed the Social Security Disability Benefits
Reform Act of 1984, which mandated a new standard of review-medical improvement-for termination of disability benefits. Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794
(1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 423(f) (1988)).
' Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1323. The Social Security Act encompasses two
programs, Title XVI (SSI), 86 Stat. 1465 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1381-1383d
(1988)) and Title II (SSDI), 49 Stat. 622 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 401-433 (1988)).
Each provides benefits for the disabled but serves different constituencies. SSI,
established in 1972 and made effective January 1, 1974, federalized existing state
public assistance disability programs and was designed essentially as an income
maintenance program. Strict income and savings restrictions limit SSI benefits to
only those who are indigent as well as completely disabled. In contrast, Social
Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") is an insurance program that inures to the
benefit of only those who pay into the system through FICA contributions and,
with the exception of a child's or widow's benefits, who have worked for five of
the last ten years. SSDI benefits are calculated according to a claimant's salary
history. SSI benefits, while often substantially lower, are available to those claimants who do not meet the SSDI earnings requirement or who have never been

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60: 765

hausted,4 she commenced an action in federal district court
individually and on behalf of all similarly situated persons
whose disability benefit claims were terminated or denied.'
Ms. Stieberger's claim alleged that denial or termination of
benefits to the class was based on the SSA's unlawful policy of
nonacquiescence in decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.6 The resulting litigation culminated in the largest Social Security class action in New York
history.7
Stieberger v. Sullivan was settled in 1992.' The relief the
employed.
" Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act specifies four administrative levels
through which each claimant must seek redress before commencing an action in
federal district court. After filing an initial application, a claimant who is denied
benefits may request reconsideration (a paper review of the merits of the initial
decision). 20 C.F.R. § 404.907 (1993). Upon denial, the claimant may request a
hearing before an administrative law judge ("AL"), who makes findings of fact,
weighs the evidence, applies relevant regulations, and issues a decision. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.950 (1993). Finally, unfavorable decisions may be appealed to the Appeals
Council, a 20-member body based in Virginia. 20 C.F.R. § 404.967 (1993). The
Appeals Council may deny or grant the request for review. If the request is granted, the Appeals Council may either remand the case to an AUJ or issue a decision. A determination to not overrule the ALJ's decision constitutes the final decision of the SSA. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. The claimant then may seek judicial review
in federal district court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988).
Stieberger's initial application and request for reconsideration were denied.
She appeared at her hearing pro se, where the AW denied her claims for SSI and
SSDI benefits. Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1323. Her request for review by the
Appeals Council was also denied. Id.
' Stieberger 1, 615 F. Supp. at 1400. The class was certified pursuant to Rule
23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and consisted of "[alll New York
State residents whose claims for benefits or continuation of benefits have been or
will be denied or terminated pursuant to hearings before administrative law judges
since October 1, 1981, based on a determination that they do not have a disability
that prevents them from engaging in substantial gainful activity; and whose benefits have not been granted or restored through subsequent appeals." Id. at 1328.
6 Id.
at 1321, 1328; Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 728. For a discussion of
the SSA's policy of nonacquiescence, see infra notes 27-73 and accompanying text.
Ms. Stieberger's claim also alleged that the SSA's "Bellmon Review" policy
was unlawful because it subjected pro-claimant ("allowance") decisions of AJs to
agency review. See infra note 75, for a discussion of the Bellmon Review aspect of
the case.
1 Letter from David S. Udell, Senior Attorney, Legal Services for the Elderly,
Matthew Diller, The Legal Aid Society, and Jill Boskey, MFY Legal Services, to
Social Security Disability Claimants' Representatives (Mar. 3, 1993) [hereinafter
Udell Letter]. A virtually identical memorandum was issued by Brigitte Laforest of
The Legal Aid Society's Stieberger Implementation Project (Jan. 10, 1994) [hereinafter Laforest Letter].
' Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y.), modified by 801 F.
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settlement established is potentially enormous, measured both
in simple human terms and as precedent for future actions
against the SSA. Under the settlement, individual claims dating as far back as 1981 may be reopened and readjudicated.?
Moreover, as an example of private-party intervention in agency policymaking, the case may well be unparalleled. It partially
unearthed the process by which agency personnel had formulated a systematic policy to terminate recipients' disability
benefits unlawfully and to deny disability benefits to otherwise
eligible claimants." As was revealed through discovery for the
first time, the SSA refused to adhere to the doctrine of stare
decisis by nonacquiescing in decisions of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit."
Pursuant to the Stieberger settlement agreement, the SSA
agreed to mail notices to approximately 300,000 class members
offering to reopen their claims, to re-adjudicate those claims, to
pay up to four years of retroactive benefits, and to pay continuing benefits to those claimants who receive a favorable decision.12 In addition, the settlement mandated that the SSA
instruct each agency adjudicator to apply the law developed by
the Second Circuit when deciding all future disability
claims."
Although the Stieberger settlement crafted far-reaching
retroactive and prescriptive relief, its ultimate results may be
more circumscribed. In a subsequent class action, Schisler v.
Sullivan,4 the Second Circuit upheld the validity of SSA regulations promulgated in 1991 that fundamentally differed from
the judicially created rules Stieberger was designed to enSupp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y.).
Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1381-82.
10 Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. 716.
n Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1321; Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 732. For a
discussion of the policy of nonacquiescence, see infra notes 27-73 and accompanying text.
2 Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1397; Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at
1382, 1385-86; Udell Letter, supra note 7, at 1.
13 13 Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1379. Summarized versions
of selected
Second Circuit decisions are contained in a Manual of Second Circuit Disability
Decisions and are discussed infra at notes 231-39 and accompanying text.
" Schisler v. Sullivan, 3 F.3d 563 (2d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Schisler III]. For
a discussion of this case, see infra notes 185-204 and accompanying text. See also
Deborah Pines, 2d Circuit Revises Standardfor Testimony, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 25, 1993,
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force."5 The result left the SSA procedures for reopening
claims largely intact but undermined the substantive
changes
16
created.
have
to
thought
was
Stieberger
in the law
Part I of this Comment discusses the SSA policies of nonacquiescence and the class actions that have challenged those
policies. Part II examines Stieberger, and places it in the context of other recent Social Security class actions.
Part III analyzes the Stieberger settlement and argues
that it contained substantive limitations and implementation
problems that may significantly diminish the opportunity of
some class members to obtain relief. The first substantive
limitation in Stieberger was the district court's highly restrictive definition of agency non-acquiescence. Rather than allowing claimants to prove nonacquiescence in their individual cases, the court required the claimants to prove a "system-wide
pattern of mistaken adjudication," thereby ignoring the effect
of nonacquiescence on individual claimants. 7 Second, the Second Circuit was excessively deferential to SSA representations
regarding its own acquiescence policy, 8 as well as the SSA's
presumed authority to promulgate regulations in direct conflict
with the rulings of the Second Circuit. 9 A little more than a

" Stieberger challenged SSA nonacquiescence in, inter alia, the treating physician rule, articulated by the Second Circuit in Schisler v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 43 (2d
Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Schisler II]. The treating physician rule required that the
opinion of a treating physician concerning the medical disability of a claimant be
binding on the SSA, unless contradicted by substantial evidence, and even if contradicted the opinion was entitled to some extra weight. Schisler v. Heckler, 787
F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Schisler I].
6 See, e.g., Jeffrey Freedman, New Rulings Move SSA Away from Policy of
"Non-acquiescence," 63 N.Y. ST. B.J. 22 (1991) (commenting on Stieberger III, 738
F. Supp. 716); Udell Letter, supra note 7.
17 Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 728.
" Stieberger II, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986) (vacating the district court's prelim-

inary injunction on the grounds of the injunctive relief upheld in Schisler 1);
Schisler I, 787 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1986). The SSA's representation that it was now
pursuing a policy of acquiescence was, in fact, false. See infra note 170 and accompanying text. The Second Circuit's deference to the SSA's counsel was, as the
court subsequently recognized, unjustified. Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 736 (calling the SSA's representation that it was in compliance with the treating physician
rule "simply wrong"); Schisler II, 851 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1988).
" For example, one year before the Stieberger settlement became effective, the
SSA promulgated such a conflicting regulation. Standards for Consultative Examinations and Existing Medical Evidence 56 Fed. Reg. 36,932 (1991) (codified at 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927 (1993)) [hereinafter Standards]; Schisler III, 3 F.3d
563 (upholding the validity of this regulation) [hereinafter Schisler III]. For a
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year after the Stieberger settlement, the Second Circuit in
Schisler v. Sullivan, upheld such a regulation."
In addition, the Stieberger settlement contained four implementation problems that may limit its effectiveness. First,
the settlement did not require the SSA to reopen any claims or
to establish a timetable for completing the adjudication of
those claims that it did reopen.2" Second, the settlement allowed the SSA to make a de novo review of the medical evidence in any reopened claims.22 One effect of de novo review
of a claimant's medical evidence is that the SSA may deny the
claim based on insufficiency of evidence without first determining whether the agency had based its original decision on unlawful nonacquiescence.2" Third, the value of a district court
remand pursuant to Stieberger may be very limited not only
because under the de novo standard a claim may be susceptible to denial on both factual and legal grounds, but because
the settlement limits retroactive benefits to a maximum of four
years.24 Finally, prospective changes in agency decisionmaking will be restricted because the settlement failed to require
discussion of how this regulation confficts with Second Circuit disability holdings,
see infra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
20 3 F.3d 563. Stieberger was brought in part to challenge the SSA's nonacquiescence in the treating physician rule. Schisler II, 851 F.2d 43, was the most
often-cited case for this rule. In Schisler II, the Second Circuit upheld the authority of the district court to rewrite a proposed Social Security Ruling ("SSR") that
incompletely embodied the treating physician rule. See infra notes 176-80. The
SSA issued the rewritten Schisler ruling in 1989, and the SSA subsequently promulgated a regulation, not an SSR, concerning the weight to be given the opinion
of a treating physician that was substantially different from the treating physician
rule. See Standards, supra note 19. The court in Schisler III upheld the validity of
this regulation. 3 F.3d at 569. A crucial result of the Schisler III decision is that
the SSA, pursuant to paragraph 4(f) of the Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at
1379 (1 4(f)), may remove the instruction concerning Schisler from the Manual of
Second Circuit Decisions. For a discussion of the Manual, see infra notes 231-39
and accompanying text. In November 1993, the SSA rescinded the Schisler 11
ruling in favor of its new regulation. 58 Fed. Reg. 60,042 (1993).
2 See Udell Letter, supra note 7; Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 138284 (
9, 10). The Stieberger settlement required only that the SSA send a notice
to class members offering to reopen claims, and acknowledge the receipt of reopening requests, conduct an initial screening process, transmit to the proper adjudicators any claims they decide merit reopening, and notify individual class members
of the outcome.
Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1385 (Q 10(a)).
23 See infra notes 211-21 and accompanying text.
24 See Udell Letter, supra note 7; Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 138586 (1% 10(b), (e)(4)).
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Administrative Law Judges ("ALJs") or Appeals Council judges
to cite and apply Social Security and circuit court case law. 5
This Comment concludes with a proposal to eliminate the
Appeals Council and replace it with an Article III Court of
Social Security Appeals.26 This proposal differs substantially
from earlier congressional proposals and responds to criticism
concerning the potential politicization, lack of expertise, and
geographical inconvenience of such a court. By adjudicating
all disability appeals, this court would have the jurisdiction to
affirm or reverse decisions rendered at the hearing level and,
most importantly, could develop independent case law to be
applied by all SSA adjudicators.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Intracircuit Nonacquiescence by
Administration

the Social Security

1. Historical Nonacquiescence
Nonacquiescence" is the policy of refusing to follow the
2' Currently, ALJs and Appeals Council judges must consult a manual containing abstracted holdings of some Second Circuit cases, but they continue to apply
these holdings only as interpreted by SSA personnel pursuant to SSRs. In addition, neither adjudicators nor counsel (nor members of the public) have access to
all final decisions of the Secretary, which may include unappealed decisions at any
level of the claims process. The SSA has not joined the practice of such agencies
as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Aviation Administration,
and the National Transportation Safety Board in developing, publishing and citing
to its own decisions.
26 For other recommendations of specialized Social Security courts by the Administrative Conference of the United States, see 1 C.F.R. § 305.91-9 (1993), and
most recently, The Federal Administrative Judiciary, 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-7 (1993).
See also Robert E. Rains, A Specialized Court for Social Security?, 15 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1 (1987).
27 See H.R. 4419, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. 4647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986); Rains, supra note 26, at 25-30.
28 Three types of nonacquiescence have been identified by commentators:
intercircuit nonacquiescence, nonacquiescence because of venue choice, and
intracircuit nonacquiescence. Intercircuit nonacquiescence occurs when an administrative agency declines to follow the holding of one circuit court when processing a
claim reviewable by another circuit court. Nonacquiescence because of venue choice
occurs when a single administrative claim is subject to review by more than one
circuit court. Intracircuit nonacquiescence-the focus of this Comment-occurs when
an administrative agency in a particular claim declines to follow the precedent of
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decision of a United States court of appeals except for the
specific case decided by that court." Typically, the SSA cites
three reasons for declining to give precedential effect to any
case except those cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court: the need for national uniformity, separation of powers,
and the statutory requirement devolving on the SSA to interpret and establish rules pursuant to the Social Security Act.
The SSA argues that these policies justify agency resistance to
judicial holdings that contradict its established policies and
interpretations.' °

the only circuit with jurisdiction to review the claim. See Dan T. Coenen, The
Constitutional Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 1339
(1991); see also Samuel Figler, Executive "Agency Nonacquiescence to Judicial Opinions, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1664 (1993); Peter J. Rooney, Note, Nonacquiescence
by the Securities and Exchange Commission: Its Relevance to the Nonacquiescence
Debate, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1992).
29 Intracircuit nonacquiescence as a general policy has been subjected to extensive scrutiny by commentators. This Comment does not discuss in detail the legality of nonacquiescence nor the constitutional bases for challenging its practice (separation of powers and due process), which have been studied extensively by commentators. See generally Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit
Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher
& Revesz, 99 YALE L.J 801 (1990); Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, The
Uneasy Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence: A Reply, 99 YALE L.J 831
(1990); Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989); Miriam R. Rubin and Karen A.
Naughton, Government Nonacquiescence Case in Point: Social Security Litigation, 2
TOURO L. REV. 197 (1986); Jody L. Davis, Casenote, Nonacquiescence by the Social
Security Administration as a Matter of Law: Using Stieberger v. Sullivan as a
Model, 44 MERCER L. REv. 1453 (1993); Angela M. Johnson, Note, The Social
Security Administration's Policy of Nonacquiescence, 62 IND. L. J. 1101 (1986-87);
Ann Ruben, Note, Social Security Administration in Crisis: Non-Acquiescence and
Social Insecurity, 52 BROOK L. REv. 89 (1986). The Stieberger I court's analysis of
the legality of nonacquiescence is discussed infra at note 30.
9 Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1357-67. The Stieberger I court's description of
the SSA's defense of its nonacquiescence policy and its analysis of the policy's
ultimate illegality is comprehensive. First, the SSA argued that the principle of
separation of powers as expressed in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) does
not directly undermine its nonacquiescence policy since "ordinary rules regarding
the binding effect of judicial pronouncements do not apply with equal force to the
federal government." Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1368. The court in Stieberger I
was dubious of "the limiting construction on Marbury which defendants propose."
Id. at 1357. The well-known language of Marbury specifically directed that "[ilt is,
emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is." Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177; see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958)
("[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution."); Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1497 n.5 (9th Cir.) ("What the Court said
[in Marbury and Cooper] with regard to the Constitution applied with full force
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with regard to federal statutory law."), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
463 U.S. 1328 (1983).
Second, the SSA asserted that its duty to administer the Social Security Act
uniformly throughout the nation made nonacquiescence necessary. Stieberger I, 615
F. Supp. at 1361; see also 42 U.S.C. § 421(k)(1) (1988) (requiring the SSA to "establish by regulation uniform standards which shall be applied at all levels of
determination, review, and adjudication in determining whether individuals are
under disabilities"). The Stieberger I court held that the SSA's uniformity argument "not only fails to dispel the serious doubts concerning the legal validity of
its policy, but in fact highlights some of the most troubling consequences of that
policy." Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1361. In particular, the court pointed to "the
inherent unfairness of the Secretary's policy to the very persons whom the Social
Security Act was designed to protect." Id. at 1362.
Nothing tests more acutely the sincerity of our nation's commitment to
the concept of "Equal Justice Under the Law" than the manner in which
our government agencies respect the legal rights of its poorest and least
influential citizens. This is especially so in dealing with the rights of
those who are often unable to obtain legal representation and are unaware of their rights. It is unfortunate that in its desire to promote uniform legal standards for the disabled, the government has lost sight of
the similarly compelling evil of disuniformity which its non-acquiescence
policy entails. The consequence of the SSA's non-acquiescence policy is
simply this: one set of rules applies to those claimants fortunate enough
to procure legal representation, persistent enough to appeal an adverse
determination of the various non-acquiescing levels of the agency to a
federal court bound to follow the Court of Appeals ruling, and healthy
enough to endure this belabored process; a different and adverse rule will
govern the rights of those claimants who are unrepresented, insufficiently
persistent in their efforts to invoke the benefits of favorable judicial rulings, or incapable of doing so.
Id. at 1362-63.
Moreover, in 1984, the House of Representatives passed a Social Security bill
severely critical of nonacquiescence. See H.R. Rep. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
25 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038. Conversely, the Senate's bill permitted nonacquiescence. It merely required the Secretary to send notice to the
Senate Finance Committee and publish notice in the Federal Register regarding
whether it would acquiesce in the decisions of the United States courts of appeals.
S. 476, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984). The Conference Committee failed to reach
agreement on the issue, and Congress enacted the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 without any mention of nonacquiescence. Pub. L. No. 98460, 98 Stat. 1794 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
Nonetheless, the Conference Committee pointedly challenged the SSA's policy
on nonacquiescence:
The conferees do not intend that the agreement to drop both provisions
[in the House and Senate] be interpreted as approval of "non-acquiescence" by a federal agency to an interpretation of a U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals as a general practice. On the contrary, the conferees note that
questions have been raised about the constitutional basis of non-acquiescence and many of the conferees have strong concerns about some of the
ways in which this policy has been applied, even if constitutional. Thus,
the conferees urge that a policy of non-acquiescence be followed only in
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The SSA had followed a limited nonacquiescence policy
since about 1966,"' and ten years later began a comprehensive nonacquiescence policy." This more comprehensive policy
was characterized by formal expressions of nonacquiescence in
agency instruction materials and through Social Security Rulings ("SSRs") that specifically directed adjudicators not to apply appellate holdings. 3 By 1985, the SSA had abandoned
formal nonacquiescence but continued to practice "silent nonacquiescence." Rather than formally announcing its refusal to
apply appellate decisions, the SSA simply ignored these decisions and maintained its conflicting rules and regulations.3 4

situations where the Administration has initiated or has the reasonable
expectation and intention of initiating the steps necessary to receive a
review of the issue in the Supreme Court.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 797, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3095. See Carolyn A. Kubitschek, Social Security Administration Nonacquiescence: The Need for Legislative Curbs on Agency Discretion, 50 U. PITT. L.
REV. 399 (1989); Johnson, supra note 29, at 1109-11; Coenen, supra note 28, at
1343-44, 1376-77 (noting that the "the clash between executive and judicial
decisionmakers has spawned one of the most important modem issues in constitutional law-and an issue that the Supreme Court has yet to visit").
",See SSR 66-23c, declining to follow Cyrus v. Celebrezze, 341 F.2d 192 (4th
Cir. 1965) and Massey v. Celebrezze, 345 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1965).
32 See Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 728; Kubitschek, supra note 30.
s Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 747 ("[W]here a district or circuit court['s
decision contains interpretations of the law, regulations, or ruling[s that] are inconsistent with the Secretary's interpretations, the ALJs should not consider such
decisions binding on future cases simply because the case is not appealed.") (quoting the Office of Hearings and Appeals "OHA" Handbook, § 1-161).
As OHA Associate Commissioner Louis B. Hays noted, " '[Tihe federal courts
do not run SSA's programs . . .ALJs are responsible for applying the Secretary's
policies and guidelines regardless of court decisions below the level of the Supreme
Court.'" Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1351 (quoting Memorandum to Agency ALJs
(Jan. 7, 1982).
During this 14-year period, between 1975 and 1989, the SSA neither acquiesced in nor formally nonacquiesced in a Second Circuit disability opinion. Rather,
the SSA instructed its adjudicators to not apply court decisions conflicting with
agency rules, in effect ignoring the Second Circuit altogether. Stieberger III, 738 F.
Supp. at 747.
" Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 728. Concomitantly, the Secretary declined to
challenge adverse appellate decisions by petitioning for certiorari. As a result, the
SSA prevented itself from facing an unfavorable, binding decision of the Supreme
Court. Claimants thus were forced to adjudicate the same issues repeatedly in
appellate courts. Most claimants, however, won at the appellate level and therefore
were barred from seeking Supreme Court review of the SSA's underlying nonacquiescence policy. In 1984, Congress expressed its disappointment with the SSA's
practice of nonacquiescence:
By refusing to apply circuit court interpretations and by not promptly
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The SSA simultaneously promulgated a new rule establishing
a complex procedure for partially applying appellate court decisions. This rule was a direct result of the Stieberger litigation. 5
The rule, embodied in Interim Circular 185 ("IC-185"),
required the SSA to issue an Acquiescence Ruling ("AR"),
which describes an appellate case and explains how the agency
would apply it. 6 Under IC-185, after receiving an AR, an AUJ
would make two decisions, one based solely on agency policy,
the other on a court of appeals holding as interpreted by the
AR. If the AU were prepared to deny a claim under both SSA
policy and an AR, the ALJ issued a "decisional rationale"
which addressed both sources. If the claimant then requested
review, the Appeals Council would determine if a court might
decide against the SSA. If so, the Appeals Council would
award benefits to the claimant. An AU who was prepared to
grant benefits under an AR but not under agency policy would
write a "recommended favorable decision." If the Appeals
Council agreed with the A.J, but also believed the issue
should be relitigated in the circuit court, it issued an unfavorable decision and forwarded it to a Special Policy Review Committee. Only if the Office of General Counsel of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of
Justice agreed that relitigation was appropriate, would the
unfavorable decision be adopted."

seeking review by the Supreme Court, the Secretary forces beneficiaries
to re-litigate the same issue over and over again in the circuit, at substantial expense to both beneficiaries and the federal government. This is
clearly an undesirable consequence.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 797, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3096. See Kubitschek, supra note 30, at 402; Rains, supra note 26, at
15.
", Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 759 ("The Court also cannot ignore the fact
that the evolution of [the] SSA's acquiescence policy appears to have been driven
in large part by this litigation. Each significant modification of agency policy came
shortly before a major stage of this case.").
" Id. at 748. An acquiescence ruling ("AR") would be issued only when the
court decision was squarely at odds with agency policy. It was to be applied only
at the OHA level (at the ALJ and Appeals Council stages), that is, not in the
initial application and reconsideration stages. Thus, as the Stieberger III court noted, where an AR was not issued, and in all adjudications below the AI.J stage,
decisionmakers were instructed to continue to nonacquiesce in appellate holdings.

Id.

"7

Id. at 748-49; Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1369-74. The SSA established the
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In late 1985, the SSA issued Transmittal X-7, which modified the procedure for partially applying decisions of the courts
of appeals.38 This new rule provided that an AR reporting a
court of appeals decision would apply to all administrative
levels of review in situations where: prompt relitigation of the
policy would not be sought; application of the AR was feasible
and would not have an "unacceptably adverse effect on Social
Security programs"; or where the agency planned to modify its
regulations to conform to a circuit court holding. 9 The bifurcated procedures of IC-185 remained in effect where an AR did
not apply at all administrative levels."
In addition, between 1986 and 1989, memoranda from the
Associate Commissioner of the Office of Hearings and Appeals
("OHA") discussed aspects of SSA nonacquiescence but did not
explicitly overrule this policy.4 ' SSA Continuing Legal Education programs taught adjudicators how to apply circuit court
case law in a way that, as the Stieberger court characterized it,
advantaged the SSA. 2 Finally, in 1990 new regulations be-

Acquiescence Task Force in July 1985 to implement IC-185, by reviewing circuit
court decisions and issuing ARs where there was a conflict between the circuit
court and a policy of the SSA. Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 751. The Task Force
began with a staff of 12. Its staff was reduced to four in September 1985 and
then to two. Finally, in 1987 the Task Force was terminated. Id. By June 1989,
the SSA had issued 37 ARs, none of which reported Second Circuit disability decisions. Id. at 752.
"' Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 750.
9 Id.

Id. Applying IC-185 in this situation distinguishes the substantive law applicable at the initial application and reconsideration levels from that at the ALJ
and Appeals Council levels. The SSA rejected a recommendation to notify claimants of this distinction on the grounds of increased administrative costs. Id.
4" See id. at 740, 755-57.
42 Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 757. One afternoon of the training was devoted to applying circuit court decisions. The Stieberger III court recognized:
SSA clearly teaches adjudicators how to write decisions with the goal of
passing judicial scrutiny. It also seems to instruct them how to apply
decisions of courts of appeal to the facts in their cases, but it very carefully avoids explicitly directing them to use such decisions affirmatively
in the decision-making process. An adjudicator, after reading SSA policy
statements and undergoing Continuing Legal Education efforts, could well
come away with the impression that the goal of writing decisions is just
to avoid reversal, not to apply the full breadth of court of appeals holdings.
Id.
In addition, under SSA rules adjudicators must apply appellate decisions only
as embodied in an AR. However, because the SSA never issued an AR reporting a
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came effective that described the limited conditions under
which SSA would issue ARs, and confirmed that adjudicators
could not apply a circuit court holding unless it was first reported in an AR."
2. Nonacquiescence in Second Circuit Holdings
At the time of the Stieberger settlement, the Second Circuit had issued a number of substantive holdings that concerned the SSA's adjudication of disability claims, and the enforcement of the Second Circuit's decisions against contradictory SSA regulations. By far, the most influential Second Circuit
decision dealt with the weight that the SSA was required to
give to the uncontradicted opinion of a claimant's treating
physician. The "treating physician rule" established that a
physician's opinion was binding unless contradicted by substantial evidence.44 Even if contradicted, the treating
physician's opinion was still entitled to substantially greater
weight than that of the Secretary's consulting examiner."
The SSA nonacquiesced in the "treating physician rule,"
thus forcing the Second Circuit to articulate the rule in dozens
of cases.46 In two well-known instances, the court issued
scathing denunciations of the agency's silent nonacquies-

Second Circuit disability holding, see supra note 33, adjudicators could not apply
these disability holdings, and the SSA could not properly be said to be acquiescing
in them.
43

Id.

at 757.

When we determine that a United States Court of Appeals holding conflicts with our interpretation of a provision of the Social Security Act or
regulations and the Government does not seek further review or is unsuccessful on further review, we will issue an [AR] that describes the
administrative case and the court decision, identifies the issue involved,
and explains how we will apply the holding, including, as necessary, how
the holding relates to other decisions within the applicable circuit.
Id. at 757-58 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.985(b), 416.1485(b) (1993)).
14 Schisler II, 851 F.2d at 46-47; Bluvband v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 886, 892 (2d
Cir. 1984); Donato v. Secretary of HHS, 721 F.2d 414, 419 (2d Cir. 1983); Rivera
v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 717, 723 (2d Cir. 1983); Carroll v. Secretary of HHS, 705
F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983); Hankerson v. Harris, 636 F.2d 893, 896 (2d Cir.
1980); Eiden v. Secretary of HEW, 616 F.2d 63, 64 (2d Cir. 1980); Bastien v.
Califano, 572 F.2d 908, 912 (2d Cir. 1978); Gold v. Secretary of HEW, 463 F.2d
38, 42 (2d Cir. 1972).
" Schisler 11, 851 F.2d at 46-47.
41 For a discussion of this phenomenon, see supra note 34.
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cence 4 1 Similarly, the Stieberger I court denounced the SSA's
practice of nonacquiescence in the "treating physician rule":
The sheer volume of cases in this Circuit in which an administrative
denial of benefits was overturned due to failure to properly apply
the Second Circuit's treating physician rule is strong evidence that
the Secretary's policy on the weight to be given to treating physician
opinions is not in accord with Second Circuit caselaw.48

Instead of acquiescing in the decisions of the Second Circuit, the SSA required its adjudicators to follow two SSRs that
included other circuits' cases holding differently. Neither SSR
established that a treating physician's opinion is binding in
disability determinations in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary. SSR 82-48c stated that "although the
opinion of an examining physician is generally entitled to more
weight than the opinion of a non-examining physician, the ALJ
is free to reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence
supports

a

contrary

conclusion." 4

Similarly, SSR

83-6c

warned that a treating physician "might have been leaning
over backwards to support the application of disability benefits." The Stieberger court concluded: "Read together, these
various SSRs... strongly convey an approach to the treating
physician's opinion which understates the significance of such
an opinion and which is not in accord with the views of the
Second Circuit.... The evidence of agency non-acquiescence in

the Second Circuit's treating physician rule is overwhelming.

, 51

The SSA also nonacquiesced in Second Circuit decisions

'
DeLeon v. Secretary of HBS, 734 F.2d 930, 937 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that
the cases reversing the Secretary's denial of benefits because the AUJ failed to
apply the treating physician rule are "almost legion"); see also Hidalgo v. Bowen,
822 F.2d 294, 296 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Legion' should no longer be modified by 'almost.' We have relied upon the treating physician rule in 23 cases in which the
administrative decision denying disability benefits has been either reversed or
We cite these cases to emphasize how often the rule has been exremanded ....
pounded, and also to indicate some sense of frustration at how little, if any, impact our decisions have had on the Secretary and his administrative fact-finders.").
" Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1347.
SSR 82-48c, reporting Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1981).
50 SSR 83-6c, reporting Cummins v. Schweiker, 670 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1982).
, Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1346, 1349. In addition to the Second Circuit
decisions, the court cited 26 district court decisions overturning the Secretary's
denial of benefits based on failure to follow the treating physician rule. Id. at
1347.
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that established the right to cross-examine authors of posthearing reports,52 and decisions that accorded "limited
weight" to personal observations of the claimant by the ALJ."
In addition, although the Stieberger III court eventually held
that the SSA's conduct did not constitute nonacquiescence,
the SSA ignored Second Circuit holdings that established standards for evaluating a claimant's credibility,55 and those holdings that established a duty to accord weight to the disability
determinations of other agencies56 and a duty to assist pro se
claimants.57
B. Class Actions Challenging SSA Policies
For claimants whose benefits were denied or terminated,
the class action represents the most potent weapon against the
SSA. In the context of a general challenge to SSA policy, the
class action is effective in enforcing the legal rights of similarly
situated claimants.58 Class action litigation represents the
62 Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1984); Gullo v. Califano, 609
F.2d 649, 650 (2d Cir. 1979); cf. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.950(d), 416.1450(d) (1993) (providing that a request to subpoena a witness must be filed five days before a hearing, but not indicating that a subpoena may be issued after a hearing to enable a
claimant to cross-examine the author of a post-hearing report). See Stieberger III,
738 F. Supp. at 738.
3 Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 740; DeLeon v. Secretary of HHS, 734 F.2d
930 (2d Cir. 1984); Carroll v. Secretary of HHS, 705 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983). The
AUJ's reliance on his personal observations of the claimant at the hearing is commonly known as the "sit-and-squirm" test. The name derives from the common
AUJ practice of making disability determinations in back-injury cases based on
whether the claimant could sit comfortably in the witness chair throughout the
hearing.
64 For a discussion of the Stieberger III court's definition of nonacquiescence
and criticism of this definition as too stringent, see infra notes 122-52 and accompanying text.
" Rivera v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 719, 725 (2d Cir. 1983); Singletary v. Secretary of HHS, 623 F.2d 217, 219 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Stieberger III, 738 F.
Supp. at 742. Determining a claimant's credibility figures prominently in two instances: (1) where a claimant alleges a disability but has a good work record; and
(2) where a claimant alleges disabling pain. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 26061 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that credibility findings must be set forth "with sufficient specificity to enable [the court] to decide whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence"); Ferrares v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir.
1984) (same); see also SSR 88-13; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii) (1993).
66
67
68

See supra note 142.
See supra note 143.

FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(3); Kubitschek, supra note 30, at 642.
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forum other than the Supreme Court would ordinarily have no
precedential effect on a subsequent individual action.5 9
Recent class action litigation directed against SSA nonacquiescence originated with Lopez v. Heckler, ° which challenged
the SSA's refusal to follow the Ninth Circuit's standard for
continued SSDI and SSI benefits."' A second case, Schisler v.
Heckler,62 originally was brought to challenge SSA procedures
to terminate benefits to mentally disabled persons, but over
time evolved into a direct challenge to the Secretary's refusal
to acquiesce in the Second Circuit's "treating physician
rule. 63
A similar class action, Hyatt v. Heckler,' was brought in
the Fourth Circuit to challenge the SSA's procedures for denying and terminating claims involving diabetes mellitus, hypertension, and pain. Although the Fourth Circuit initially vacated the district court's injunction, on remand from the Supreme
Court,65 the Fourth Circuit held that claims involving diabetes and hypertension must be evaluated in accordance with the
law of the circuit.6 6 The court concluded: "The evidence did

"' For a discussion of nonacquiescence, see supra notes 28-53 and accompanying
text.
" 572 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 725 F.2d 1489
(9th Cir. 1983), vacated on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984). The Supreme
Court did not reach the issue of nonacquiescence in Lopez, nor has it done so in
any case to date.
", The Ninth Circuit held that the medical improvement standard was proper,
and rejected the SSA's clandestine adoption of treating continuing benefits cases as
new applications. 725 F.2d at 1510. The medical improvement standard was eventually enacted statutorily. Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984,
42 U.S.C. § 423(f) (1988). See also Kubitschek, supra note 30, at 643.
6" Schisler v. Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 1538 (W.D.N.Y. 1983); Schisler v. Heckler,
107 F.R.D. 609 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd and remanded in part,
Schisler I, 787 F.2d 76, aff'd in part and rev'd in part, sub nom., Schisler II, 851
F.2d 43, aff'd in part and rev'd in part, sub nom., Schisler III, 3 F.3d 563.
See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
64 Hyatt v. Heckler, 579 F. Supp. 985 (W.D.N.C. 1984), vacated and remanded,
757 F.2d 1455 (4th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded sub nom., Hyatt v. Bowen,
476 U.S. 1167 (1986); Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376 (4th Cir. 1986) (on remand).
65 Hyatt, 807 F.2d at 381. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the
Fourth Circuit and remanded for further consideration in light of Bowen v. City of
New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986).
66 In comparison, claims involving pain were to be evaluated in accordance
with the Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (1988),
which superseded the Fourth Circuit's rulings concerning evaluation of claims of
disabling pain. Hyatt, 807 F.2d at 381.
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not reveal mere irregularities or errors in individual cases. Instead, it depicted a systematic, unpublished policy that denied
benefits in disregard of the law."67 Specifically, the court noted that "[i]t is unrealistic to believe that publication of both
the agency's regulations and the court of appeals' decisions
would alert persons to the Secretary's nonacquiescence in circuit law."6 The court rejected the district court's grant of injunctive relief to class plaintiffs, however, finding that the
SSA's elimination of a conflicting SSR made such relief unnecessary.6 9
Class actions have successfully challenged SSA procedures,
policies, and rules that did not directly involve nonacquiescence. For example, SSA's procedures for evaluating mental
disorders were struck through a class action brought in the
Second Circuit." In a recent class action challenging the
SSA's procedures for evaluating child disability claims originally brought in the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court held that
the SSA's regulations violated the Social Security Act.71 Similarly, a Second Circuit class action successfully challenged the
SSA's procedures for evaluating cardiovascular disabilities, and
resulted in the potential reopening of thousands of claims.72

with the Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (1988),
which superseded the Fourth Circuit's rulings concerning evaluation of claims of
disabling pain. Hyatt, 807 F.2d at 381.
67

Id.

68

Id.

69 Id.

The SSA eliminated SSR 82-55, which nonacquiesced in the Fourth

Circuit's holdings concerning diabetes and hypertension.
7" City of New York v. Heckler, 578 F. Supp. 1109 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 720 F.2d
729 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467
(1986). The Supreme Court did not rule on the substantive violation, only the
procedural issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
71 Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990). The Court held that the SSA's policy of denying SSI benefits to children whose impairments were not included in the
Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. pt. 404. subpt. P, App. 1 (1993), was inconsistent with the statutory standard of "comparable severity," 42 U.S.C. §
1382a(c)(3)(A) (1988), because it deprived children of the ability to show that they
were nonetheless functionally disabled. Zebley, 493 U.S. at 535-41.
72 New York v. Sullivan, 906 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1990). For an interesting technologically oriented discussion of this case, see Bonnie E. Muir, Comment, Technology Overtakes Entitlements: State of New York v. Sullivan, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 517 (1993). Other class actions adjudicated within the last two years
have involved individual ALJ bias, Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332 (3d Cir. 1993);
Kendrick v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); state agency practices, Day
v. Sullivan, 794 F. Supp. 801 (S.D. Ohio 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
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Although these numerous challenges to SSA policy and
practice were important, two lawsuits, Schisler and Stieberger,
represent the high water mark of class action litigation against
fundamental SSA procedures. The Second Circuit's early articulation of the "treating physician rule," and its consistent opposition to the SSA's attempts to circumvent this rule in favor of
its own interpretive stance, made a showdown between the
Second Circuit and the SSA inevitable.73 By 1993, after nearly
a decade of SSA intransigence, the Second Circuit faced one of
only two possible choices: continue to demand that the SSA follow Second Circuit procedures for determining disability, or
allow the SSA to promulgate its own rules that would effectively return the agency's procedures to the status quo ante. That
the Second Circuit ultimately chose the latter course poignantly demonstrates the powerful potential-and concomitant
weakness-of the class action to redirect SSA disability procedures.7 4

II. STIEBERGER V. SULLIVAN
A. ProceduralHistory
Stieberger's amended complaint specifically challenged
both the SSA's policies of nonacquiescence in Second Circuit
disability decisions and the SSA's Bellmon Review program.7 5
sub nom., Day v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 1052 (6th Cir. 1994); rules for the evaluation of
AIDS claims, Rosetti v. Sullivan, 788 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D. Pa. 1992); chronic alcoholism and drug dependency, Schoolcraft v. Sullivan, 971 F.2d 81 (8th Cir. 1992);
initial calculation of SSI benefits, Farley v. Sullivan, 983 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1993);
and the policy of counting veterans' benefits paid to support a veteran's dependent
as dependent's unearned income for the purpose of calculating his SSI benefits.
White v. Shalala, 7 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 1993).
See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text.
See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
' Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1321. The Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980 (sponsored by Senator Henry Bellmon) originated "Bellmon Review,"
the bureaucratic practice of reviewing ALJ's disability decisions. Social Security
Disability Amendments of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 421 (1982). Congress was particularly
concerned with the frequent reversals by AUJs of unfavorable determinations made
by state agencies at the reconsideration level, AU's rate of allowance decisions,
Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1376; Association of Administrative Law Judges v.
Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1134 (D.D.C. 1984), and the apparent disparities
among ALU decisions. In response to these concerns, the SSA promulgated SSR
82-13. Through this ruling, the SSA announced the implementation of an own-mo-
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After additional claimants either intervened or joined through
consolidation, plaintiffs' experiences fully represented how the
SSA's disability application and termination policies worked in
practice.76 Stieberger sought injunctive relief, a writ of mandamus and class certification.77
Stieberger's individual claim was based on unlawful termination of disability benefits. Her claim alleged that an AUJ's
finding disregarded contradictory Second Circuit law. The ALJ
had simply rejected the opinion of plaintiff's treating physician
that the plaintiff was totally disabled.7" Similarly, one
intervenor's claim asserted that he had encountered almost

tion review by the Appeals Council for "a prescribed percentage" of decisions rendered by certain ALJs, "particularly those [who had] allow[ed] previously denied
claims for disability benefits." SSR 82-13.
The Secretary's decision to establish own-motion review of ALJs with the
highest allowance rates prompted a lawsuit in 1984 by the Association of Administrative Law Judges. See Association of Admin. Law Judges, 594 F. Supp. at 1132.
The action challenged the program, alleging that it violated an A's
right to
"decisional independence" under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§
551-560 (1988). See Association of Admin. Law Judges, 594 F. Supp. at 1133. Although the court ultimately denied injunctive relief, the litigation itself pressured
the SSA to modify its policy that same year. Id. at 1141. Specifically, AIJs with
high allowance rates were no longer individually targeted for review. Stieberger I,
615 F. Supp. at 1397.
The Stieberger court voiced its serious concern with the allowance-based portion of Bellmon Review, noting "[tihe danger of an unduly coercive or pressureinducing review procedure" that "threatens the integrity and impartiality of the
factfinding which is so crucial to the proper functioning of the disability determination process." Id. at 1395. The court also argued that "this case involves the
implementation of a result-based review procedure in which individual ALJs were
singled out for decisional review, a process which members of Congress, the judiciary and the ALT corps itself have recognized as being quite likely to create prejudicial pressures to deny benefits to disability claimants." Id. at 1396.
Despite its concerns with Bellmon Review, however, the court ultimately refused to enjoin the SSA from continuing Bellmon Review since the SSA had in
fact modified its policy to eliminate allowance-based review. Id. at 1397. Therefore,
the court ruled, Stieberger class plaintiffs had failed to show that they were likely
to succeed in demonstrating the invalidity of the policy then in practice. Id. Rather, the current practice represented "a reasonable reconciliation of the Secretary's
desire to preserve some means for reviewing otherwise unreviewable ALT allowance decisions and the claimants' desire to minimize the unfavorable impact of the
Bellmon Review on ALJ decisionmaking." Id.
This portion of the decision was not appealed, and subsequent litigation focused solely on nonaciuiescence. See generally Association of Administrative Law
Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1984).
7 Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1326-27.
" Id.
at 1315.
7 Id. at 1323.
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identical administrative experiences in the denial of his application for disability benefits; another intervenor, an elevenyear-old retarded boy, alleged that he had been granted SSI
benefits by the Appeals Council, yet had never received payment.7 9 The ALJs who had denied the applications of the two
claimants added through consolidation either accorded impermissible weight to consulting examiners in impeaching the
opinions of the claimants' treating physicians, or had simply
ignored these opinions altogether."0
After an extensive series of pretrial motions, the district
court granted Stieberger's motion for class certification. 8 The
court also enjoined the implementation of the SSA's original
nonacquiescence policy, finding that the disability claimant
class was likely to succeed on the merits."
The SSA appealed and in 1986 the Second Circuit vacated
the preliminary injunction on the grounds that the injunctive
relief granted in another class action, Schisler v. Heckler,3
removed the justification for such relief. Schisler had required
the SSA to accord binding weight to the uncontradicted and
clinically supported opinions of a claimant's treating physician.' Although the Stieberger court recognized that the class
in Schisler was less extensive than that in Stieberger,nonetheless it held that Schisler had "substantially reduced the need"
8 5 Moreover, the court found that
for further injunctive relief.
vacating the Stieberger injunction and proceeding with the
injunction in Schisler would "minimize intrusion into the administrative process and at the same time accord the Secretary
the opportunity to demonstrate his good faith compliance with
the law of this Circuit."8 6 The court, however, kept open the
possibility of injunctive relief, hinting that a preliminary injunction would be appropriate if the Secretary did not proceed
"expeditiously" to instruct all adjudicators to apply the treating

79 Id.

at 1324.

0 Id. at 1324.
", Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1400; see supra note 5.
82 Id.

at 1399.

Schisler I, 787 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1986).
s' Id. at 76.
's Stieberger II, 801 F.2d at 37.
's

'6

Id. at 38.
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physician rule. 7
After extensive discovery revealed the contents of numerous agency documents relating to the newly created (and subsequently disbanded) Acquiescence Task Force," Stieberger
moved for summary judgment. In 1990, the district court
granted her motion with respect to four areas of agency nonacquiescence, and denied her motion with respect to nine others. 9 Additionally, the court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment for those class members "represented by
counsel at the last stage of the administrative process who
knew or should have known of the facts giving rise to this
action."9 Finally, the court reinstated the injunction against
the implementation of SSA's acquiescence policy, and ordered
the parties to submit revised remedial orders.91
In 1992, 14 years after Theresa Stieberger's disability
benefits were terminated, and eight years after she had filed
her claim, the district court approved the Stieberger settlement
agreement.9 2
B. The Settlement Agreement
The Stieberger settlement crafted wide-ranging relief for
approximately 300,000 Social Security claimants and will remain in effect until the year 2000."3 Named members of the
plaintiff class-including Theresa Stieberger-were awarded
substantial retroactive benefits.9 4 The settlement provided
Id.
The Acquiescence Task Force was formed in July 1985 to implement the
SSA's nonacquiescence policy described in IC-185. See Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp.
at 735; supra note 37.
89 Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 758-59; see infra notes 137-49 and accompanying text.
" Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 758.
91 Id. at 759-60.
9 Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1376.
13 Id. at 1391 (9 20). Although the agreement expires eight years after the
date of the settlement, obligations to take action or benefits awarded pursuant to
reopenings of claims are unaffected by its expiration.
94Id. (9 21). Pursuant to the settlement, Stieberger was paid retroactive and
current SSDI benefits from December 1981 (she had already been paid retroactive
SSI benefits), and would also be allowed to present evidence regarding why her
1974 claim should be reopened. The two intervenors were also paid retroactive
SSDI benefits.
Although these awards represented a substantial victory, they are nevertheless
87

8
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that the SSA would identify class members who met enumerated criteria and would send each of them notice, after which
they would have 180 days to request a reopening. 5 Detailed
procedures were established to govern the SSA's initial determination of whether a requestor satisfied the criteria for reopening. 9'
Pursuant to the settlement, after a claimant requests a
reopening of her claim, the SSA considers the following: whether the claimant had been a New York State resident at the
time of the administrative adjudication; whether the claim had
been denied or terminated on disability grounds; and whether
this decision had been rendered at any level of administrative
review between October 1, 1981 and October 17, 1985, or at
the OHA level after October 17, 1985, up until when the SSA
issued instructions to its adjudicators to follow Second Circuit
decisions. "7 Claimants whose denials or terminations fall outside these three threshold circumstances are not entitled to a
reopening." The settlement merely requires the SSA to make

troubling. The relief awarded to the three named members of the plaintiff
class-actual payment of retroactive benefits-is far more generous than the relief
crafted for the 300,000-member plaintiff class. The only relief they received was
the possibility of the SSA reopening their applications, readjudicating their claims,
and awarding benefits within a limited four-year period. See infra notes 96-102
and accompanying text.
7(b), 8). The settlement applied only to New York residents
" Id. at 1382 (
at the time of the prior determination whose claim had been terminated or denied
on medical or vocational grounds. Other issues, such as the amount of insurance
coverage (quarters) and substantial gainful activity, were specifically excluded. Id.
at 1382 (%7(b)(1), (3)). Claimants whose application for SSDI or SSI benefits were
terminated or denied between October 1, 1981, and the date the SSA sent instructions to each adjudicator requiring them to apply decisions of the Second Circuit
(pursuant to Attachment 1), met the criteria for class membership if the denial or
termination had occurred either at any administrative level between October 1,
1981, and October 17, 1985, or at the ALJ or Appeals Council levels between
October 18, 1985, and the effective date of Attachment 1. Id. at 1382 (% 8(a),
(c)(i)-ii)).

The SSA was further required to identify potential class members and send
individual notice to each member within 120 days of identification. Recipients had
180 days to respond. The SSA then would send an acknowledgment to each requester within 30 days. Id. at 1382-84 (%9).
"GId. at 1383 (%9(h)). The SSA was required to send a notice to each requester who was denied a reopening, and judicial review to challenge the SSA's decision was available.
9 Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1382 (1% 7, 8).
" Id. In addition, the SSA will not reopen claims that were appealed and overturned, and those already fully reevaluated under another class action. Id. at 1385
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these initial determinations "within a reasonable time."99
A claimant whose request for reopening falls within these
threshold standards is contacted by her local SSA office, instructed to complete an application, and informed of her right
to submit medical evidence.'00 If the claimant has no additional pending claim, the reopened claim is adjudicated at the
reconsideration level, rather than at the initial application
level.'
Pending claims are consolidated with reopened
claims and adjudicated at the level of the pending claim or at
reconsideration level, whichever is higher." 2 The record is
developed for a maximum four-year period prior to the reopening request, as well as subsequent to the request."3 A class
member whose earlier claim was pending in a district court or
in the Second Circuit can elect either to receive a reopening
pursuant to the settlement or to proceed with a separate court
case. If the class member chooses a reopening from the0 4SSA,
the agency will agree to remand the claim for reopening.
The settlement also requires that the SSA instruct all
adjudicators to comply with holdings in Second Circuit disability decisions, rescind all previous nonacquiescence policies and
rulings, and issue detailed instructions concerning individual
holdings.' ° Each adjudicator is provided with a Manual of
Second Circuit DisabilityDecisions,which contains an abstract
of individual disability holdings issued before the settlement
date. Each office receives copies of subsequent Second Circuit
decisions.' If either party petitioned for a rehearing or cer(I110(a), (c)(2)).

102

1383 (9110(h)).
1386 .(910(e)(1)).
discussion of these administrative levels, see supra note 4.
Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1386 (9110(e)(2)).

10

Id.

99 Id. at
100 Id. at
10' For a

at 1386 (

10(e)(4)).

Id. at 1386 (91 10(b), (e)(3)).
105 Id. at 1378-79 ( I 2, 3), 1381 (91 6); see also Attachment 1, "Application of
Second Circuit Decisions to Social Security Act Disability Benefit Claims of New
York Residents." The Settlement requires the SSA to rescind, as applicable to New
York State residents seeking disability benefits, all policies, procedures and SSRs:
that state a general policy of nonacquiescence, or hold that the Secretary is bound
only by decisions of the United States Supreme Court; that the SSA's statutory
interpretation or implementation supersede those of the Second Circuit; that Second Circuit holdings are binding only when adopted in a SSR or acquiescence
ruling; or that Second Circuit holdings have no stare decisis effect. See supra
notes 28-43 and accompanying text. The ramifications of this clause are discussed
infra at notes 231-42 and accompanying text.
100 Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1379 (%1 4(b), 5(a)). The Manual is
104
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tiorari of the Second Circuit decision (thus drawing a disability
decision into question), however, the SSA need not acquiesce
and can instead instruct its adjudicators not to apply the holding." 7 If a disability decision has changed since the SSA originally adjudicated a claim, it must follow the law in effect at
the time the claim is reopened.0 8
The settlement also resolves all claims by class members
who challenged the "Bellmon Review" program.' 9 It explicitly
does not resolve any claims challenging the regulations ultimately found valid by Schisler II.1°
Finally, the settlement requires the SSA to furnish
plaintiffs' counsel with detailed information concerning the
SSA's implementation of the settlement, including a statistical
implementation report every 120 days and a sample of reopened cases."' In addition, plaintiffs' counsel must receive
prior notice of all SSA instructions concerning reopening procedures and is given 30 days to object or comment. If plaintiffs'
counsel does object, the SSA is prohibited from issuing the instructions." 2

the Manual upon the occurrence of certain conditions. Stieberger Settlement, 792 F.
Supp. at 1379 (1 4(f)). These conditions have occurred. See supra note 19.
" Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1380 (% 5(e)(1)). This rule, however, is
subject to detailed procedures and rescission within 10 days if the Second Circuit
decision is no longer subject to review. Id. at 1388-81 (1 5(e)(2), (3), (4)).
1.. The Stieberger settlement provides:
In adjudicating reopened claims, SSA shall require its decisionmakers and
reviewers of decisions to apply the holdings in Second Circuit disability
decisions i4 accordance with the provisions set forth in this settlement
agreement, including the instruction set forth as Attachment 1. SSA shall
require the decisionmakers and reviewers to apply the law in effect on the
date on which the new determination on the reopened claim is rendered.
Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1384 (Q 10) (emphasis added). For a discussion of this problem, see infra notes 215-21 and accompanying text.
,09Id. at 1389 (Q 14). For a discussion of Bellmon Review, see supra note 75.
n See 56 Fed. Reg. 36,932 (1991); Schisler III, 3 F.3d at 567-69; Stieberger
Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1389 (1 14). For a discussion of this case, see infra
notes 185-204 and accompanying text.
" Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1388 (% 11(a), (b)). Allowing plaintiffs'
counsel access to a sample of reopened cases is designed "solely for the purpose of
monitoring compliance with the settlement." Id. (% 10(b)).
11

Id. (%[10(d)(i-(iii)).
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III. ANALYSIS
A.

Substantive Limitations of the Stieberger Settlement

The settlement agreement approved by the court in 1992
crafted exceptionally wide relief."' First, it resolved the
claims of the entire plaintiff class, requiring the SSA to identify potential class members and notify them of their rights
under the settlement." 4 Second, the policy changes required
of the SSA are applicable to all claimants, not only to those
identified as class members." 5 Certain provisions of the settlement represent substantial concessions by the SSA. These
provisions provide for the publication and mandatory availabil-6
ity of the Manual of Second Circuit Disability Decisions,"
and of a volume containing all disability decisions of the Second Circuit rendered after the settlement,"7 as well as detailed rescission instructions."'
The opportunity of class and non-class members"' to obtain relief under the settlement, however, is limited in two
crucial ways. First, because it relied on the Stieberger court's
overly restrictive definition of SSA nonacquiescence, the settlement may not end all of the SSA's nonacquiescence policies
in several important Second Circuit precedents. 2 ' Second,
the settlement did not effectively stop the SSA's nonacquiescence in the "treating physician rule" because the Second Circuit was excessively deferential to the SSA's claimed authority
to promulgate conflicting regulations. In the end, the SSA was
able to regulate this rule out of existence.'2 1

...
Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1377.
114 Id. at 1378; see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
.. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
116 Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1379 (914(c)); The Manual is discussed
infra at notes 231-39 and accompanying text.
117 Id. at 1379 (Q1 5(a)).
118 Id. at 1381 (N 6); see supra note 105.
.. The provision of the Stieberger settlement requiring the SSA to apply Second
Circuit disability decisions applies to all decisions rendered to claimants residing
in New York State, whether or not a claimant is a member of the Stieberger class.
See Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1378 (912).
12' See infra notes 122-52 and accompanying text.
121 See infra notes 153-204 and accompanying text.
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1. The Restrictive Definition of SSA Nonacquiescence
The centerpiece of the Stieberger settlement is the provision that mandates that the SSA rescind all nonacquiescence
instructions'22 and that its decisionmakers be bound only by
Supreme Court decisions.'23 Additionally, the settlement requires the SSA to rescind its earlier instructions that state
that decisionmakers should ignore circuit court holdings that
contradicted the Secretary's statutory interpretation of the
Social Security Act unless an acquiescence ruling had adopted
these decisions.'24 The now-rescinded instructions had formed
the basis of the SSA's policy of formal nonacquiescence.'25
Further, the settlement states that all SSA decisionmakers
must "comply with holdings in Second Circuit disability decisions in adjudicating or reviewing claims for disability benefits .)126

The settlement, however, fails to define "nonacquiescence."
Instead, it relies on the restrictive definition of the Stieberger
court, which limited SSA nonacquiescence to a "system-wide
pattern of mistaken adjudication." 27 In the event of future
litigation concerning agency nonacquiescence under the
Stieberger settlement, this definition will limit the relief available to the plaintiff class to only the four specific areas of nonacquiescence already found by the court. 2 '
In reaching its restrictive definition of "nonacquiescence,"
the Stieberger court first distinguished formal and "silent"
nonacquiescence and addressed whether the SSA had deliber-

The settlement excepts regulations from this prohibition.
Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp at 1381 (5 6).
124 Id. For a discussion of the SSA's acquiescence rulings, a formal acquiescence
in a holding of a circuit court of appeals, see supra note 32 and accompanying
text.
125 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
126 Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1378 (9 2).
1'
Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 728.
128 Id. at 758-59; see supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text. The court found
that the SSA had nonacquiesced in the Second Circuit's treating physician rule
and in the following Second Circuit holdings: a claimant may cross-examine the
authors of post-hearing reports; the ALJ may accord only limited weight to his
personal observations of the claimant's physical and mental condition; and the testimony of a claimant with a good work history is deemed to be substantially credible. Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 758-59.
12
2
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ately refused to implement the Second Circuit rulings.'2 9 The
court subjected the SSA's silent nonacquiescence policy to a
two-prong test, one that required both "substantial differences"
between the SSA policy and the decision of the Second Circuit,
and "substantial impact" of silent nonacquiescence upon the
SSA's adjudicatory process.' The substantial impact prong
in turn required evidence of "a system-wide pattern of mistaken adjudication," defined as a "series" of earlier court cases
which reversed the SSA's final determination for failure to
apply a particular Second Circuit holding. 3 '
The Stieberger court, however, left ambiguous exactly what
constituted such a series of earlier cases. It asserted that "[a]
small number of cases over a significant period of time where
courts reversed for failure to apply a court of appeals holding... could not be called non-acquiescence."' 3 2 The court
held, however, that "if a rather large number of courts have
found that SSA adjudicators failed to apply a particular holding, the difference between agency policy and the particular
holding can be said to have influenced agency adjudication.""33
' The court attempted to justify this distinction by arguing that it provided an opportunity for SSA officials to determine the existence of differences between agency policy and a
Second Circuit decision.134 Only if (1) "a number of courts"
had reversed cases because SSA adjudicators failed to apply a
holding, or if (2) "some group within SSA" had informed agency
officials of these differences and the SSA failed to reconcile its
policy with the court's holding, could the agency's omission be
considered deliberate.3 5 The SSA's conduct would only then
constitute nonacquiescence.'3 6
The court next applied the two-prong test to the claims of
the Stieberger plaintiff class. The plaintiffs argued that the
SSA had nonacquiesced in thirteen specific holdings of the
Second Circuit. However, despite substantial evidence to the

19 Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 728.
1"0 Id. (citing Floyd v. Sullivan, 833 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1987)).
131
112

Id.
Id. at 729.

123 Id.

...Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 729.
15 Id.

136 Id.
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contrary, the court found that the SSA had nonacquiesced in
only four holdings." 7 For example, the court found that the
SSA required that its decisionmakers discuss and analyze both
objective medical evidence and the claimant's subjective complaints when making credibility findings in cases alleging
disabling pain.'3 8 In contrast, the holdings of the Second Circuit mandated such credibility analysis in all cases.3 9 The
Stieberger I court, however, refused to decide whether "substantial differences" between SSA policy and the Second Circuit existed because "only a couple of courts" had determined
that the SSA had not applied the Second Circuit holding.'4 °
Instead, the court simply concluded that "the absence of a significant number of cases where [the] SSA failed to apply this
holding coupled with the absence of any acknowledgment by
[the] SSA of [its] failure to apply the holding leads us to conclude that plaintiffs have not established non-acquiescence to
their detriment in this area of the law."'
The court also compared the differences between SSA
policy and Second Circuit case law concerning the SSA's duties
to accord weight to disability determinations of other agencies' and to assist pro se claimants.
In both instances
'

Id. at 758-59; see supra note 128.

'3'

SSR 88-13 states that "[iln evaluating a claimant's subjective complaints of

pain, the adjudicator must give full consideration to all of the available evidence,
medical and other, that reflects on the impairment and any attendant limitation of
function." See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii) (1993) (delineating seven factors the decisionmaker must consider).
...The Stieberger court conceded that "[w]hile arguably not inconsistent with
the Second Circuit holdings, the SSA's policy does differ in certain respects from
the Second Circuit holdings with respect to credibility findings." Stieberger III, 738
F. Supp. at 743; see also Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 260-61 (2d Cir. 1988)
(instructing that "[a] finding that the witness is not credible must nevertheless be
set forth with sufficient specificity to permit intelligible plenary review of the
record"); Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that "the
crucial factors in any determination must be set forth with sufficient specificity to
enable [the court] to decide whether the determination is supported by substantial
evidence.").
.. Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 743-44. The Stieberger III court noted that
there were five such decisions. Baran v. Bowen, 710 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);
Holland v. Bowen No. 88-2301, 1988 WL 25112 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1988); Weber v.
Bowen, No. 874617, 1988 WL 138160 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1988); Brandon v. Bowen,
666 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); James v. Bowen, No. 85-6379, 1987 WIL 15123
(S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1987).
141 Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 744.
12 Second Circuit decisions and the SSA's regulations are substantially differ-
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the court found that the SSA had failed to apply Second Circuit holdings.' However, since it found only a "handful of
cases" that reversed the SSA's decisions on the basis of its
failure to follow these holdings, the court determined that
neither practice satisfied the substantial impact prong of the
test.45 Thus, the court concluded that the SSA had

ent. Compare Havas v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 783, 786 n.1 (2d Cir. 1986) ("'While the
determination of another governmental agency that a social security benefits claimant is disabled is not binding on the Secretary, it is entitled to some weight and
should be considered.'") (quoting Cuther v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1282, 1286 (2d
Cir. 1975)); Hankerson v. Harris, 636 F.2d 893, 896 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that
although not binding on the SSA, the determination of another agency that a
claimant is disabled is entitled to some weight and should be considered); Parker
v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 233 (2d Cir. 1980) (same) with 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1504,
416.904 (1993) (mandating that "[a decision by any other governmental agency
about whether you are disabled or blind is based upon its rule and is not our
decision about whether you are disabled or blind"); and 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(e),
416.913(e) (1993) (advising that "information from other sources . . . may help us
to understand how your impairment affects your ability to work" but failing to require that determinations by other agencies be accorded some weight); see also
Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 744.
" Second Circuit decisions holding that AL's have a heightened duty to assist
pro se claimants conflict with the SSA's regulations. Compare Echevarria v. Secretary of HHS, 685 F.2d 751, 755-56 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that when a claimant is
pro se the AU is under a heightened duty "to scrupulously and conscientiously
probe into . . . relevant facts," and must inform him of his proposed action and
provide an opportunity for the claimant to obtain a more detailed statement from
his treating physician) and Gold v. Secretary of HEW, 463 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir.
1972) (holding that when a claimant is pro se the A.J must undertake a "searching investigation" of the record) with 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.944, 416.1444 (1993) (requiring the ALJ to look fully into the issues but failing to establish a heightened
duty or require the AIU to inform a pro se claimant of his proposed action and to
provide him with an opportunity to obtain a more detailed statement from his
treating physician); see also Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 746.
'" Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 745-46.
.4 See Wallace v. Bowen, 678 F. Supp. 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that the
SSA failed to apply the Second Circuit's requirement to accord some weight to the
disability determinations of other agencies); Fusco v. Bowen, No. CV-85-371, 1987
WL 18771 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1987) (same); Visser v. Heckler, No. 83-3479, 1986
WL 2205 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1986) (same); Dunbar v. Califano, 454 F. Supp. 1261
(W.D.N.Y. 1978) (same); see also Sobocinski v. Bowen, 678 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (holding that the SSA failed to follow the Second Circuit's rule requiring the
agency to inform a pro se claimant of his proposed action and give him an opportunity to submit a detailed statement from his treating physician); Wallace v.
Bowen, 678 F. Supp. 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same); Ramirez v. Secretary of HHS,
No. 85-7778, 1986 WL 11191 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1986) (same); Hernandez v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same); Rodriguez v. Schweiker, 520 F.
Supp. 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same). Four other allegations of agency nonacquiescence
were denied on other grounds. Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 759.
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"acquiesced."
The fundamental flaw in the Stieberger I court's analysis
of nonacquiescence is its adherence to the substantial impact
prong of the test. This test is highly ambiguous because: (1)
the court never defined how "substantial" the impact on the
adjudicatory process must be in order for the SSA's policy to be
classified as nonacquiescence; and (2) the court did not apply
the test in a uniform manner. In one instance, the court held
that five cases that reversed the SSA's decision on the grounds
that the SSA's policy conflicted with applicable Second Circuit
decisions were insufficient to constitute nonacquiescence,'46
while in another instance, the court held that nine cases-just
four more-were enough to establish a pattern. " 7 In yet another instance, the Stieberger I court held that the SSA had
nonacquiesced in a Second Circuit's rule on the basis of only
two district court cases. " The discrepant application of the
substantial impact prong of the StiebergerI court's nonacquiescence test within the decision itself reveals the test's ambiguity.
As a result of the court's adherence to the substantial
impact test, claimants now must meet a threshold showing
that the SSA's refusal to follow a Second Circuit holding already has been litigated in favor of other claimants. That is,
litigants can prove that the SSA is nonacquiescing only if they
demonstrate that a "substantial" number of district court cases
reversing the SSA are based on the SSA's failure to apply an
applicable Second Circuit holding.'
For example, whether a

...See supra note 157.
147 Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 742 (nonacquiescence when the SSA failed to
follow the Second Circuit's holding that the testimony of a claimant with a good
work history is deemed to be substantially credible).
, ' Id. at 740 (SSA failed to acquiesce in a Second Circuit ruling that gave a
claimant a right to cross-examine the authors of post-hearing reports); see Tripodi
v. Heckler, 100 F.R.D. 736 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that a claimant had a right to
cross-examine the authors of post-hearing reports); Lora v. Bowen, No. 85-7063,
1987 WL 16151 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1987) (same). This is not to argue that the
Stieberger court was wrong to hold that the SSA nonacquiesced in the Second
Circuit rule, only that to so hold on the basis of only two cases appears to be
arbitrary.
...The specificity requirement inferred from the Stieberger decision may be
illustrated as follows: suppose an ALJ denied disability benefits based on her conceded failure to adhere to a Second Circuit holding and arguably on an unrelated
factual finding. If it can be argued that the AJ's decision was based on her find-
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pro se class member.. successfully challenges the SSA's policy concerning its duty to assist her in presenting her claim for
reopening will depend upon an initial showing that many other
claimants had litigated that same issue and won."5 ' This restrictive interpretation of nonacquiescence is likely to apply to
all future challenges to SSA policies within the Second Circuit-not simply to Stieberger class members.'52
2. Excessive Deference to Agency Rulemaking
While the Stieberger settlement severely limited plaintiffs'
prospective relief, the situation was exasperated by the Second
Circuit's retreat from defending its own case law in Schisler
III. Instead of upholding its own case law, the Second Circuit
deferred to the SSA's rulemaking procedure. Stieberger was
litigated to enjoin the SSA from refusing to apply Second Circuit disability holdings in administrative adjudications.' 53
The most significant of these disability decisions was Schisler
II, which articulated the treating physician rule.'5 4 The

ing of fact-despite her failure to follow the Second Circuit-the decision may not
come up to the required specificity to be defined as an example of nonacquiescence.
5' A Stieberger class member seeking a reopening of her claim may be pro se.
All class members are, however, assisted in their claims by the Stieberger Implementation Project run by The Legal Aid Society's Civil Appeals and Law Reform
Unit. See Laforest Letter, supra note 7.
...The summary disposition of many Social Security appeals in district courts
makes even more difficult the requirement that plaintiff show that a disputed
issue was previously litigated. For example, many such cases are not reported and
may be available only to those with access to an on-line legal service such as
Westlaw or Lexis. It is precisely those pro se claimants, those subjected to a
heightened duty by the SSA, who are the most disadvantaged by this requirement.
Ironically, of course, when a particular case presents issues previously litigated the
it is more likely not to be reported. In addition, even when a decision is reported
or accessible, the court's disposition of the specific issue being challenged must
represent its holding. The SSA is not, of course, required to acquiesce to dicta.
The nature of most Social Security cases, however, hinge on several different issues. Even when the court recognizes that the SSA has failed to follow a precedent in one issue but finds sufficient justification on a second issue to hold for a
plaintiff, a subsequent plaintiff attempting to use the SSA's nonacquiescence in the
first issue may find her efforts thwarted.
"5 The decision in Stieberger I is not, of course, binding authority in the Second Circuit. Since it remains the only decision to define nonacquiescence by the
SSA, however, it will continue to have persuasive authority.
" See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
114 851 F.2d at 46-47. For a discussion of the treating physician rule, see supra
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Stieberger court held that the SSA had nonacquiesced in the
treating physician rule, but had not in the nonexamining physician rule.'55 The nonexamining physician rule is a corollary
of the treating physician rule. It prohibits the opinion of a
physician (usually a disability examiner employed by the SSA
to review medical evidence submitted by claimants and collected by claims representatives) who has never examined the
claimant,
to overrule the contrary opinion of a treating physi6
cian.

15

Under the Stieberger settlement, the SSA agreed to acquiesce in the treating physician rule.15 One year before the settlement, however, the SSA issued, through informal
rulemaldng procedures, a set of standards that differed substantially from the Second Circuit's treating physician rule. 5 '
This rule was challenged by two class actions-including the
ongoing Schisler class action.'59 The Second Circuit, in
Schisler III, accorded great deference to the SSA and upheld
the validity of the new rules. 6 ° As a result, the treating physician rule no longer exists and, therefore, the Stieberger settlement no longer mandates that the SSA accord binding effect
to the opinions of treating physicians.
The Stieberger and Schisler litigation intersected at numerous points between 1985 to 1993. In 1983, the district court
in Schisler v. Heckler, 6 ' certified a subclass consisting of
class members who were disabled by mental impairments and
had experienced hardship as a result of the SSA's review of
their disability benefits eligibility.'62 The court granted in-

notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
...Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 737-38.
...Hidalgo v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1987) (the opinion of a
nonexamining source cannot constitute the substantial evidence necessary to override the opinion of a treating source); Havas v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 783, 786 (2d Cir.
1986) (same).
157 See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
...See Standards, supra note 19.
"' Aldrich v. Sullivan, 800 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Vt. 1992); Schisler v. Sullivan,
No. 80-CV-572E, 1992 WL 170736 (W.D.N.Y. July 8, 1992).
160 3 F.3d at 569.
...574 F. Supp. 1538 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
62 Id. at 1543. This subclass consisted of those class members:
who have been or will be found eligible for Title II disability insurance
benefits or SSI disability benefits due to a mental disability, in whole or
in part, and with respect to whom review of continuing disability has
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relief to members of the subclass, and ordered the SSA to conduct a home visit or face-to-face interview before terminating
their disability benefits.'63 On a motion for summary judgment, the court remanded all class members' cases to the SSA.
The court's ruling was made pursuant to the Social Security
Disability Reform Act of 1984 ("Reform Act"), which had codified a new standard for the SSA's review of claimants' continued eligibility for benefits."6
The SSA appealed, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed the
continuing disability investigation ("CDI") program. See Social Security Disability
Amendments of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 421(i) (1982). The CDI program terminated the
disability benefits of hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries, including those who
were disabled by mental impairments and were unable to participate effectively in
the CDI process. See Schisler at 1543; Schisler I, 787 F.2d at 78 (noting that "the
greatly increased number of CDIs led to a dramatic increase in the number of
terminations. More than 470,000 people had their disability benefits terminated in
the three years after March, 1981 . . . resulting in a flurry of class-actions, including the present one, challenging the termination process.") (citation omitted).
Theresa Stieberger's disability benefits for her mental impairments were terminated as a result of the SSA's application in 1978 of what would become the CDI
program's "current-disability" standard, when she missed an appointment with an
SSA consulting physician. Stieberger I, 615 F. Supp. at 1323; see supra notes 2-3
and accompanying text. The CDrs "current disability" standard was repealed by
the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 423(f)
(1988) [hereinafter Reform Act], which required the SSA to return to the "medical
improvement" standard that it had adhered to before June, 1976. Concomitantly,
the Reform Act essentially superseded Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349
(1976), which held that an evidentiary pretermination hearing was not required in
Social Security disability benefits cases, because administrative procedures in place
adequately safeguard the due process rights of recipients of disability benefits.
"6 Schisler v. Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 1538, 1550 (W.D.N.Y. 1983). The district
court distinguished Mathews by arguing that the existence of a mental impairment
caused the risk of erroneous deprivation of benefits to outweigh the additional
administrative burden of a home or face-to-face interview. Schisler, 574 F. Supp.
at 1550.
1' Schisler v. Heckler, 107 F.R.D. 609, 614 (W.D.N.Y. 1984); Reform Act § 2(a).
This section of the Reform Act amended the Social Security Act, § 223(f), to require substantial evidence of medical improvement in the beneficiary's impairment
rendering the beneficiary able to engage in substantial gainful activity to terminate his SSDI or SSI benefits. This provision ended the SSA's secretive policy,
based on unpublished written instructions to adjudicators, to terminate disability
benefits without notice when evidence indicated that a claimant was currently able
to engage in substantial gainful activity. Schisler, 107 F.R.D. at 613-14.
Sections 2(d)(3)(A) and 2(d)(3)(B) of the Reform Act required that courts remand cases to the SSA, where the SSA determined that a beneficiary was not
entitled to continuing benefits on the ground that the impairment ceased, and
where the beneficiary was a member of a class action relating to medical improvement, certified before September 19, 1984. These section referred, of course,
to the ongoing Schisler class action.
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The SSA appealed, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed the
denial of injunctive relief, which would have mandated that
the SSA apply the "treating physician rule."'65 In 1986, the
Second Circuit, in Schisler I,166 held that the remand "should
be followed expeditiously by an order that [the] SSA state in
relevant publications ... that adjudicators at all levels, state
and federal, are to apply the treating physician rule of this
circuit."'6 7 Judge Winter, writing for the panel, noted that although the SSA's nonacquiescence in the treating physician
rule was never formally announced, 6 ' a sufficient number of
reversals in district courts and in the Second Circuit existed
"to justify plaintiff's concern that [the] SSA does not march to
that particular drummer."'6 9 Nonetheless, and quite remarkably, the court concluded that, based on statements by the
SSA's counsel during oral argument, the SSA had "in fact
adopted the treating physician rule and has not deliberately
misstated its position to us.""7 '

where the beneficiary was a member of a class action relating to medical improvement, certified before September 19, 1984. These section referred, of course,
to the ongoing Schisler class action.
, Schisler, 787 F.2d at 79.
Id. at 76.
'
Id. at 84.
IG That is, the SSA's nonacquiescence in the treating physician rule was not
published as a Nonacquiescence Ruling. The SSA, however, already had begun
practicing "silent nonacquiescence." See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
- Schisler I, 787 F.2d at 83-84.
17 Id. The court noted:
At oral argument, much time was spent on the question of what [the]
SSA's policy is with regard to the treating physician issue and what
instructions [the] SSA gives its adjudicators as to that policy. After some
colloquy, counsel for SSA [Frank A. Rosenfeld, Appellate Staff attorney in
the Civil Division of the Department of Justice] specifically informed the
court as to "the policy position of the Secretary [of the SSA] and stated,
'It is clear ...
that it is the same as the second circuit rule.'"
Id. at 83.
The court offered three reasons for concluding that "[w]e take the statements
made to us by counsel for SSA at face value." Id. at 84. First, "[als an officer of
the court, he was under an obligation of candor, and the preexisting controversy
over the treating physician rule and the relief requested in the case surely cautioned against casual misstatements." Id. Second, in Stieberger I, "entirely different
SSA lawyers informed the district court that 'the Secretary's standards for evaluating the opinion of a claimant's treating physician are consistent with Second Circuit opinions on this issue.'" Id. at 84. Third, "SSA is under a special obligation
to be clear about its acquiescence or nonacquiescence in decisions of the various
Courts of Appeals in light of the concerns of the Congress" that the SSA be dis-
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The Second Circuit's order in Schisler I was the focus of
prolonged litigation over the SSA's implementation of the
treating physician rule. On remand to the district court, the
SSA produced a draft SSR that merely included the treating
physician rule among several factors for its adjudicators to
consider. 17 ' The district court concluded that the proposed

couraged from requiring disappointed claimants to re-litigate the same issue in
court. Id.; See H. Conf. Rep. No. 797, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3096.
Judge Winter erroneously concluded that the statements by the SSA's counsel
at oral argument correctly represented the SSA's policy. He might have assumed
that written instructions of the SSA in fact reflected its policies, and that the lack
of written instructions meant that the SSA was following the Second Circuit's decisions. The SSA, however, was practicing silent nonacquiescence in the court's decisions where its position disagreed with the Second Circuit. It remains unclear
whether the SSA informed its counsel of this policy, either before oral argument
in Schisler I and Stieberger, or after the court in Schisler I accepted their representations to the contrary. As the district court in Stieberger subsequently stated:
[The] SSA's erroneous claims to the Schisler Court that its proposed
instruction codified the treating physician rule further confirms that
SSA's policy prior to compliance with the Stieberger injunction was not in
accord with the law of the Second Circuit, though counsel for SSA seems
inexplicably to have believed otherwise. The Court has no choice but to
conclude that SSA's counsel in Schisler, when he indicated to the Court
of Appeals that SSA policy was 'the same as' the treating physician rule,
was simply wrong.
Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 736. In Schisler III, Judge Winter refers to this
representation by the SSA's counsel, but does not acknowledge either that it misrepresented the SSA's true policy or that he was wrong in giving it credibility.
Schisler III, 3 F.3d at 565; see infra notes 185-204 and accompanying text,.
It appears that this was not the last time the SSA represented that there
was no contradiction between its regulation and the treating physician rule. Up
until December, 1991, at oral argument on the SSA's submission of its SSR, counsel for the SSA continued to claim that the agency did not refuse to acquiesce in
the treating physician rule. Plaintiff Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Submission of Ruling for Approval at 3, Schisler v. Sullivan, No. CV-80-572E, 1992
WL 170736 (W.D.N.Y. July 8, 1992).
...See Schisler 11, 851 F.2d at 44 (discussing the proposed SSR). As the court
noted:
The proposed draft's section on "Evaluating the Evidence and Resolving
Conflicts" did not begin until page nine and the statement of the treating
physician rule did not appear until page ten. Many aspects of the draft
SSR contained what the Secretary describes as "elaborations" on that
rule. These so-called elaborations included a formulation that made the
rule merely one of many factors, including the consistency of the
physician's opinion with other medical reports, to be considered by the
adjudicator, and a requirement that the treating physician's opinion be
supported by clinical or laboratory diagnostic evidence.
Id. at 44.
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SSR "fails to reflect, in significant respects, the treating physician rule," that "[tihere lurks in its lengthy and discursive text
bases for not applying the treating physician rule," and therefore, edited the SSR in accordance with Schisler 1.172
On appeal, the SSA argued that the district court had
exceeded its authority in editing the proposed SSR, and asked
the Second Circuit "to accord the draft SSR the traditional
deference shown to administrative rulings and to restore it in
its elaborate detail."'73 In Schisler II, the Second Circuit rejected this argument, and adopted the district court's revisions
of the proposed SSR. 74 Judge Winter stated:
[T]he deference traditionally shown to administrative rulings is not
appropriate in view of the limited goal of the remand.... So far as
the content of the SSR is concerned, the Secretary has some leeway
with regard to particular language but not with regard to substance.
Having taken the position that he has adopted the treating physician rule of this circuit, the Secretary is thereby bound to offer a
formulation of that rule based on our caselaw.17 s

The edited version of the SSR approved by the Second
Circuit faithfully reflected the substance of the treating physician rule.'76 However, as one district court judge cogently remarked, the SSA "never approved of the Treating Physician
Rule."'77 Even before the court in Schisler II approved it, the
SSA had published proposed rules in a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking that were substantially at odds with the treating
physician rule. 7 ' In 1991, the SSA issued final rules'79 and
172 Id. at 44-45 (citing to the unreported
173 Schisler II, 851 F.2d at 45.

district court opinion).

174 Id. The Second Circuit adopted the edited SSR but made two changes, giving emphasis to the "nature of the physician's relationship with the plaintiff, rather than its duration," and deleting the prohibition against overriding a treating
physician's opinion with the opinion of a nonexamining physician. Id. at 46. The
latter change was reinstated upon plaintiff's petition for rehearing. Plaintiffs successfully argued that the court misinterpreted its own precedents by relying on
Havas v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating the nonexamining physician
rule in dicta), and ignoring Hidalgo v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating
the nonexamining physician rule as a holding). Schisler II, 851 F.2d at 47.
175 Schisler II, 851 F.2d at 45.
176 Id. at 46-47 (reproducing the approved SSR at Appendix A).
" Schisler v. Sullivan, No. 80-CV-572E, 1992 WL 170736, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. July
8, 1992).
178 52 Fed. Reg. 13,014 (1987). The differences between the SSA's rules and the
treating physician rule are discussed infra at notes 199-201 and accompanying
text.
179 Standards, supra note 19. The portion of the final rule pertaining to opin-
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filed a "Notice" with the Schisler district court that the approved SSR was rendered obsolete by the final rule and would
be formally rescinded. 8 '
Following the Schisler H ruling, the Schisler plaintiffs
moved to prohibit the SSA from rescinding the approved SSR
on the grounds that such rescission would contradict the treating physician rule.' The district court agreed and ordered
the SSA to submit a new SSR which would provide its adjudicators with "clear guidance as to the Second Circuit's treating
8 2 The SSA's new SSR merely stated that all
physician rule.""
adjudicators should apply the final rule and consider the treating physician rule superseded.'" The district court ordered
the approval of the SSA's notice of rescission but limited its
effect to the SSA's adjudicators, holding that the treating physician rule continued to apply in the courts of the Second Circuit.'84

Both parties appealed, and the Second Circuit, in Schisler
III, 8 finally upheld the SSA's regulatory scheme in its entirety, effectively reversing Schisler II. Judge Winter, again
writing for the panel, argued that although the new regulations differed from the treating physician rule, they were neither arbitrary nor capricious, and were therefore valid. Since
they were valid, they were also binding on the courts.'86 The
judge reasoned that since the SSA no longer asserted that it

ions of treating physicians is codified at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (1993) (SSDI) and
20 C.F.R. § 416.927 (1993) (SSI).
18" Schisler v. Sullivan, No. CV-80-572E, 1991 WL 224407, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Oct.
25, 1991).
181 Id. The court denied plaintiff's motion to hold the SSA in contempt of the
court's order, dated October 26, 1988, prohibiting the SSA from rendering the
approved SSR obsolete by implementing its differing standards. Id. at *1.
162

Id.

83 Schisler v. Sullivan, No. 80-CV-572E, 1992 WL 170736, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. July

8, 1992) (discussing the new SSR).
18 Id. at *6. The court held that the treating physician rule shall "be given an
overriding and paramount status and effect in the courts of the Second Circuit as
appropriate and until and unless the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit otherwise declares." Id.
The district court in Schisler differentiated administrative adjudication, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1988), and judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(1988). In an identical challenge to the SSA's final rule, the district court in
Aldrich v. Sullivan, 800 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Vt. 1992) followed this approach.
18 3 F.3d at 569.
18 Id. at 568.
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was adopting the treating physician rule (because it had attempted to rescind the approved SSR), it could validly promulgate contrary regulations without further judicial interfer1 87
ence.
To support its deferential view, the court erroneously construed plaintiffs' challenge to the validity of the SSA's regulations. The court mistakenly interpreted the plaintiffs protest
of the SSA's elimination of the treating physician rule as a
general challenge to the SSA's authority to promulgate regulations.'88 The court then cited Heckler v. Campbell8 9 and
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 9 ' for the proposition that agency regulations that are
reasonable and not "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute" should be accorded deference. 9 '
Although these cases have superficial appeal, the particular facts of the prolonged Schisler litigation distinguish
Schisler from either Campbell or Chevron. The Court in Campbell held that based on rulemaking alone the SSA could determine whether in general a sufficient number of jobs existed in
the national economy for which a claimant was qualified. The
court thereby relieved the SSA of its obligation of presenting
the testimony of a vocational expert at an individualized hearing. 92 In resolving this question, the Court noted that this
issue is not unique to each claimant, and allowed the SSA to
"rely on its rulemaking authority to determine issues that do
not require case-by-case consideration."'93 In contrast, the application of the treating physician rule always involves individualized, case-by-case analysis of the medical facts underpinning each plaintiffs disability claim.
The Second Circuit also held that since the regulation at
issue was neither arbitrary nor capricious, it was barred from

1R

See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
Schisler III, 3 F.3d at 563 (stating that "[tihe Secretary has the statutory

authority to promulgate regulations concerning the weighing of evidence, including
the weight to be given to opinions of treating physicians").
' 461 U.S. 458, 466 (1983) (stating that the Secretary's authority to promulgate regulations under the Social Security Act is "exceptionally broad").
,- 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (stating that when a statute is ambiguous, a reviewing
court's analysis is limited to whether an agency's interpretation is reasonable).
"' Id. at 844.
Campbell, 461 U.S. 467-68.
193 Id. at 467.
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challenging or even modifying it based on the Supreme Court's
instructions in Chevron.' The Court in Chevron articulated
a "two-step" analysis for judicial review of an agency's statutory interpretation. Step one involved ascertaining whether Congress "has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If
the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.""' Only when
the statute is "silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue" may the court review the agency's regulations under
step two, and then its scope of review is limited to whether the
agency's interpretation of the statute was reasonable.'96
Chevron, however, was predicated on the gap-filling role
Congress had intended for an agency when it did not specifically legislate on an issue.'97 Given the particular statutory context at issue in Chevron,9 ' the Court held that Congressional
intent was ambiguous and that the agency's regulatory construction of the statute was reasonable. 99 In contrast, Congress was neither silent nor ambiguous with respect to medical

194 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.
19 Id., 467 U.S. at 842-43.

Id. at 843.
The Court quoted with approval the famous gap-filling passage from
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974): "The power of an administrative agency to
administer a congressionally created . . .program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gaps left, implicitly or explicitly,
by Congress." Ruiz, 415 U.S. at 231. The Court in Chevron concluded
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency
on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a
court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for
a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44; see also Abner S. Greene, Adjudicative Retroactivity
in Administrative Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 261, 276 ("In short, at [Chevron] stage
1, a court determines the meaning of the law to the extent possible given the
standard sources of law, and forbids the agency from acting outside the scope of
such meaning. But at stage 2 law has stopped . . . and discretion takes over.").
"' Chevron involved the EPA's regulatory definition of the term "stationary
source" as used in the Clean Air Act. The EPA defined the term to include all
pollution-emitting devices of a single plant ("a bubble") rather than considering
each device separately. 467 U.S. at 840.
"

'" Id.

199

Id.
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evidence obtained from a treating physician. The Reform Act
required that the SSA "make every reasonable effort to obtain
from the individual's treating physician (or other treating
health provider) all medical evidence, including diagnostic
tests, necessary in order to properly make such [disability]
determination, prior to evaluating medical evidence obtained
from any other source on a consultative basis."00 Step one of
the Chevron analysis for judicial review of administrative interpretation, therefore, was satisfied because Congress had
unambiguously indicated its intent. The Schisler III court
should have stopped its analysis at step one but, instead, it
erroneously proceeded to apply the deferential scope of review
under step two of the Chevron analysis. To apply Chevron
properly, the Schisler III court should have noted the temporal
orientation of the Social Security Act (requiring treating physician evidence to be evaluated prior to that obtained from a
consulting physician) and contrasted it with the SSA's regulation that merely required all medical evidence to be evaluated1
20
and specifying the weight to be accorded such evidence.
2" Reform Act § 9 (emphasis added) (amending the Social Security Act §
221(d)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(B) (1988)).
201 Under these regulations, the SSA applies six factors to determine what
weight to give opinions from treating sources, consulting physicians (consultants
whose examination of a claimant is paid for by the SSA), and nonexamining sources (generally disability personnel employed by the SSA who draw medical conclusions based solely on the record). These factors are: (1) the length of the treatment relationship; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (3)
supportability; (4) consistency; (5) specialization; and (6) other factors. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(d), 416.927(d) (1993).
These regulations differ significantly from the Second Circuit's treating physician rule. A treating physician's opinion that is both supported by medical evidence and uncontradicted by other evidence is no longer binding on the SSA. Instead, under the regulations the SSA considers all of the opinion evidence at the
same time, assigning weight by applying the six factors. The detailed explanation
accompanying the final rules are helpful in discerning these differences. As the
SSA has stated:
Under the Act, a claimant is required to prove to us that he or she is
disabled by providing medical and other evidence of disability. We consider medical opinions, including treating source opinions, to be evidence
that must be evaluated together with all of the other evidence in a
person's case record. Sometimes, medical opinions may be entitled to so
much weight that they control the issues they address; other times opinions may be entitled to less weight.
56 Fed. Reg. 36,932 (1991) (emphasis added). Section nine of the Social Security
Disability Benefits Reform Act may be read as requiring the SSA to determine
whether enough evidence exists from a claimant's treating physician to even war-
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Had the court in Schisler III done so, it then could have decided-pursuant to Chevron-whether the SSA's regulation was
"reasonable" given this statutory context.
The Schisler III court also failed to consider the degree to
which the SSA's regulation effectively reversed Second Circuit
precedents beyond the treating physician rule. For example, by
determining the weight to be accorded all opinion evidence, the
regulation rendered obsolete the court's holdings regarding the
weight given to opinions by non-treating physicians.022
rant commissioning an examination by a consulting examiner. For a discussion of
the Act, see supra note 162 and accompanying text. The SSA's explanation of its
regulation, however, provides no indication that treating source opinion evidence
will be evaluated to make this initial determination. Rather, this evidence will be
evaluated together with other opinion evidence.
The SSA stated that "we must give controlling weight to any treating source
medical opinion on the issues of the nature and severity of the impairment when
the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the
record." 56 Fed. Reg. 36,932. First, the explanation itself reveals that the SSA will
give controlling weight to the opinion of a treating physician only when it is already consistent with other evidence, that is, upon the receipt of a treating
physician's opinion, the SSA must also evaluate whether other evidence is warranted. The SSA will in fact purchase a consulting examiner's report at some
point in its disability determination, whatever the conclusions of a claimant's
treating physician. Second, the explanation specifically permits the SSA to impeach
a treating physician's opinion by comparing it to the opinions rendered by consulting examiners and reports issued by SSA disability personnel ("other substantial
evidence in the record"). Third, what represents "medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques" is left not to the judgment of medical professionals, but to the SSA itself. For example, the SSA explained that "medical opinions
are particularly difficult to assess since they always reflect judgments or beliefs of
the person offering the opinion that we may not be able to verify or that we may
find questionable based on our understanding of all the evidence." Id. (emphasis
added). This procedure permits a nonexamining physician employed by the SSA or
a consulting physician whose examination of the claimant is solicited by the SSA
to question the validity of a laboratory technique or clinical finding reported by a
treating physician, and to place such questions in the administrative record created at the hearing. This might well represent a sufficiently contradictory record to
justify according less weight to the opinions of a treating physician. For a discussion of how this problem was treated in the Second Circuit before Schisler III, see
infra note 202.
" Since 1987, the Second Circuit has held that the opinion of a nonexamining
physician cannot by itself overrule the opinion of a treating physician. Hidalgo v.
Bowen, 822 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1987); Havas v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1986)
(stating the nonexamining physician rule in dicta). The Stieberger court dismissed
the allegation by class plaintiffs that the SSA nonacquiesced in the nonexamining
physician rule on the ground that before the Second Circuit's decision in Hidalgo
the SSA's policy differed from the Second Circuit's holding for only four months.
Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 737. In contrast, the degree to which the opinion of
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Finally, the Schisler III court failed to account for the
unique context of the treating physician rule. Specifically, the
court ignored the fact that the SSA's nonacquiescence had
prolonged both the Schisler and Stieberger class actions. The
court did properly distinguish an agency rule from a regulation
as a matter of administrative law (the latter deserving of more
deference), and correctly acknowledged differences between the
SSR approved in Schisler 11 and the regulation at issue in
Schisler III. It failed, however, to comprehend the true magnitude of these differences and the resulting affect on the
Stieberger settlement. 3
a consulting physician (one who generally examines a claimant once) could overrule the opinion of a treating physician remained an open question in the Second
Circuit.
The regulations at issue in Schisler III may be read to reverse Hidalgo. On
the one hand, in evaluating the length of the treatment relationship the regulation
does provide:
Generally, the longer a treating source has treated you and the more
times you have been seen by a treating source, the more weight we will
give to the source's medical opinion. When the treating source has seen
you a number of times and long enough to have obtained a longitudinal
picture of your impairment, we will give the source's opinion more weight
that we would give it if it were from a nontreating source.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)(i) (1993). Moreover, the regulation recognizes that treating source opinions "may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that
cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of
individual examinations, such as consultative examinations." 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2) (1993). The SSA accords special deference to such opinions. On the
other hand, the SSA's detailed explanation in its Notice of Final Rulemaking specifically discusses how the SSA may use an opinion rendered by a nonexamining
physician to overrule the opinion by a treating physician:
[T]he weight to which the opinion of a nontreating source will be entitled
depends on such factors as the consistency of the opinion with other evidence, the qualifications of the source, and the degree to which the
source offers supporting explanations for the opinion. Even though we
may ultimately find the opinion of a nontreating medical source entitled
to greater weight than that of a treating source, the opinions of
nontreating sources are not entitled to the special deference that we give
to treating source opinions.
56 Fed. Reg. 36,936-37 (1991), see also Odorozzi v. Sullivan, 841 F. Supp. 72, 7475 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (focusing on the role of a nonexamining medical advisor and
noting that he found "a great discrepancy in the medical evidence").
Under the regulations, whether the opinion of a nonexamiing or consulting
physician may override the opinion of a treating physician is a question of fact.
See Hawkins v. Shalala, No. CV-92-5587, slip op. at 9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 1993) (a
post-Schisler III decision holding that a report of a consulting physician and testimony of a nonexamining physician cannot separately or together constitute substantial evidence to override the opinion of a treating physician).
2" Compare, for example, the regulations upheld in Schisler III and the pro-
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As a result of the Second Circuit's decision in Schisler III,
the SSA formally rescinded the Schisler I-approved SSR in
favor of its regulation." 4 The Stieberger settlement, which
had primarily prohibited SSA nonacquiescence in the treating
physician rule, now involved a much more limited set of substantive requirements.
B. Problems of Implementation in the Stieberger Settlement
Apart from substantive limitations, four major problems
impede implementation of the Stieberger settlement and may
adversely affect claimants. First, despite their complexity, the
procedures to reopen claims do not guarantee that any claim
will be reopened-even those claims that were denied by an
obvious application of the SSA's nonacquiescence policy. Second, the settlement's provision of de novo review allows the
SSA to redetermine the factual and legal underpinnings of a
reopened claim. As part of the de novo review process, the
settlement allows the regulation overriding the treating physician rule to have retroactive effect. The result is ironic: claimants who were denied benefits because the SSA had
nonacquiesced in the treating physician rule and who, as
Stieberger class members, are entitled to have their claims

posed SSR invalidated in Schisler II. See supra note 170. In essence, the regulations return SSA's disability determination procedures to where they were before
the Schisler and Stieberger class actions were brought. While the Stieberger settlement proscribes nonacquiescence, Schisler III eliminated the very rule by which
the SSA's nonacquiescence was challenged.
In fact, with only minor modifications, the regulations upheld in Schisler III
are identical to the SSA's regulations effective in 1968:
The function of deciding whether or not an individual is under a disability is the responsibility of the Secretary. . . . The weight to be given such
[treating] physician's statement [that a claimant is disabled] depends on
the extent to which it is supported by specific and complete clinical findings and is consistent with other evidence as to the severity and probable duration of the individual's impairment.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1526 (1968). The inclusion of the supportability and consistency
clauses in the Schisler III regulations return the SSA's disability determination
procedures to a point even before the Second Circuit first articulated the treating
physician rule. See Gold v. Secretary of HEW, 463 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1972); Bastien
v. Califano, 572 F.2d 908, 912 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that the "expert opinions of
a treating physician as to the existence of a disability are binding on the
factfinder, unless contradicted by substantial evidence to the contrary").
204 58 Fed. Reg. 60,042 (1993).
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reopened because the Stieberger court found this very practice
unlawful," 5 must now allow their claims to be adjudicated by
the application of a regulation that overrides the treating physician rule."' Third, the combined effects of de novo review
and retroactivity are especially restrictive in cases brought in
district court and remanded to the SSA to receive a reopening.
Finally, the settlement's provision for a Manual of Second Circuit Disability Decisions falls far short of the goal of ensuring
that ALJs and Appeals Council judges will faithfully follow
Second Circuit precedents.
1. The Procedures to Reopen Claims
The Stieberger settlement establishes complex procedures
for identifying potential class members, sending individual
notices and acknowledgments, requiring the SSA to apply
holdings of the Second Circuit in adjudicating reopened claims,
and for providing statistical reports to class counsel about its
progress in reopening claims.0 7 It does not require, however,
that the SSA actually reopen any claims or impose a deadline
on the adjudication of claims that are reopened.
Since the settlement imposes no deadline on the SSA either to determine if a class member meets the threshold standards for reopening, or to adjudicate a properly reopened
claim, it is likely that the SSA's decisionmaking process for
reopened claims will be prolonged. In fact, evidence drawn
from statistical reports and provided to class counsel shows
that the SSA has received approximately 135,000 requests for
reopening since notices were mailed in March, 1993. Of these
requests, not one has resulted in the reopening of a claim.0 '
In addition, the settlement does not require the SSA to
reopen any claims. The settlement only requires that the SSA
follow detailed procedural rules for those claims it does decide

2. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
2" For a discussion of the regulation, see supra notes 153-204 and accompany-

ing text.
207 For a discussion of these provisions of the Stieberger settlement, see supra
notes 93-112 and accompanying text.
20 Telephone interview with Jill Boskey, Staff Attorney, MFY Legal Services
(Nov. 8, 1994).
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to reopen.0 9 Even if the SSA reopens a previously denied or
terminated claim, the settlement does not require the SSA to
show that the decision was not simply the result of its nonacquiescence policy. Such an approach, had it been adopted,
would have placed the initial burden of proof on the SSA to
show that the previous denial had not been based on nonacquiescence before the SSA may declare that the denial was not
erroneous as a matter of law. The SSA could have met its
initial burden by pointing to factual findings, or the lack of
sufficient findings, that made its decision attributable to other
than simple legal error. 1 ' In cases where the SSA could not
meet their initial burden, the Settlement then could have required the SSA to begin or resume disability payments. The
advantage of this approach is that the SSA-in distinguishing
which of its denials might arguably be supported on factual or
statutory grounds-would identify precisely those cases best
suited for reopening and de novo review. Instead, under the
existing settlement the claimant bears the burden of proof
concerning whether the SSA's decision was tainted by nonacquiescence. In addition, the claimant bears the burden of proving that the medical evidence supporting her reopened claim
for disability benefits is sufficient, even if it may have sufficed
initially if not for the SSA's refusal to apply a Second Circuit
holding.
2. De Novo Review of .Previously Submitted Medical
Evidence
Rather than initially determining whether a reopened
claim had been decided in accordance with Second Circuit
holdings,211 the settlement allows the SSA to review the entire claim de novo.21 2 Under de novo review, the SSA's adjudi29 See supra notes 93-112 and accompanying text.
210 Having met its initial burden of proof, the SSA would not be entitled to

shift the burden of proof to the claimant. Rather, the SSA would still be required
to meet a subsequent burden of proof by showing that its decision was based on
substantial evidence, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988).
211 For a discussion of the failure of the Stieberger settlement to require that
the SSA make a threshold showing that its initial decision was based on something other than simple nonacquiescence, see supra note 210 and accompanying
text.
212 Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1385 (% 10(a)).
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cators are free to redetermine both the factual and legal underpinnings of a reopened claim. For example, a reopened claim
that was originally denied or terminated because the Secretary
failed to acquiesce in one or more Second Circuit holdings may
be dismissed on factual grounds alone. The adjudicator may
never be required to reach the legal issue of nonacquiescence
challenged by Stieberger.
De novo review may substantially disadvantage claimants
in two distinct ways. First, the SSA is required to develop the
record, but the claimant bears the burden of producing medical
evidence substantiating the disability.213 In essence, the
claimant must meet his or her burden of production twice: once
in the initial claim, and again upon the SSA's reopening of the
claim. As a result, claimants required to reproduce such evidence dating from as far back as the early 1980s may find it
extremely difficult or even impossible to meet their burden.
For instance, even if hospital records exist, a treating
physician's notes and records may be lost or unavailable. In
other cases, a claimant may be unable to obtain a treating
physician's narrative report because the doctor retired or died.
As a result, many reopened claims will be decided based upon
evidence that the claimant happened to keep or was able to develop, or that remained in the file. This evidence in turn may
well be limited precisely because the SSA nonacquiesced in the
Second Circuits requirement to fully develop the administrative record for pro se claimants and to solicit and evaluate
opinions of treating physicians.214
Second, the settlement's requirement that SSA decisionmakers follow the law in effect on the date of its determination
of the reopened claim," 5 rather than the law in effect when it
originally adjudicated the claim, 1 6 may reduce the amount of
benefits paid for reopened claims. The law would thus be ap-

213 A claimant bears the burden of proving eligibility for disability benefits under the Social Security Act by demonstrating that he is unable to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of a physical or mental impairment which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve
months, and that the impairment is supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), (d)(3) (1988).
214 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
215 Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1384 (%10).
216 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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plied retroactively. While this doctrine has long been established by the Supreme Court, 17 the Court has not extended
the presumption of retroactivity to administrative rulemaking.218
States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) (a court
must apply the law in effect at the time it renders the decision). At the time the
Court decided Schooner Peggy, it did not contemplate a division between the common law, a statute and an administrative regulation. Moreover, the essential problem at issue in Stieberger is that a regulation was validated by a circuit court,
thus conflating the different rules applicable to administrative regulations and case
law.
Until 1991, the Supreme Court declined to give retroactive effect automatically to a decision overruling a precedent when adjudicating conduct occurring before
the precedent was overruled in a subsequent case. Rather, the Court applied a
three-part inquiry to determine whether to give the law-changing decision retroactive or prospective effect. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971) (weighing
litigants' reliance interests and the inequity of retroactive application against the
advantages of retroactivity). In American Trucking Ass'n v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167
(1990), the Court applied the Chevron Oil test:
When the Court concludes that a law-changing decision should not be
applied retroactively, its decision is usually based on its perception that
such application would have a harsh and disruptive effect on those who
relied on prior law ....
In order to protect such reliance interests, the
Court first identifies and defines the operative conduct or events that
217 United

would be affected by the new decision. .

.

. If the operative conduct or

events occurred before the law-changing decision, a court should apply
the law prevailing at the time of the conduct.
Id. at 2338. In James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991), the
Court declined to follow these "well-established principles of civil retroactivity."
American Trucking Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. at 2339. In limiting the reach of Chevron Oil,
the Court applied a formalist model of stare decisis:
Nor, finally, are litigants to be distinguished for choice-of-law purposes on
the particular equities of their claims to prospectivity: whether they actually relied on the old rule and how they would suffer from retroactive
application of the new. It is simply in the nature of precedent, as a necessary component of any system that aspires to fairness and equality,
that the substantive law will not shift and spring on such a basis.
Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 543. Thus, new rules announced in a judicial
decision generally are applied retroactively. Id. at 538. The Court, however, left
open the possibility that members of a class action might have an additional opportunity to press their reliance interest in arguing against retroactivity: "Of
course, the generalized enquiry permits litigants to assert, and the courts to consider, the equitable and reliance interests of parties absent but similarly situated."
Id. at 543.
21 Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (stating that a
statutory grant of legislative power to promulgate regulations "will not, as a general matter, be understood to encompass the power to promulgate retroactive rules
unless that power is conveyed by Congress in express terms"). See generally
GREENE, supra note 197, at 276.

Although at least one district court interpreted the Second Circuit's decision
in Butts v. City of New York Dep't of Housing, 990 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1993), as
mandating the retroactive application of the regulations validated in Schisler III,
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Understood within the context of the Stieberger settlement
and its provisions requiring the SSA to acquiesce in the treating physician rule and other Second Circuit disability decisions, retroactivity effectively rewards the SSA for nonacquiescing.219 The SSA is not required to apply subsequently
overridden Second Circuit holdings in reopened
claims-decisions that it should have properly acquiesced to at
the time of its initial decision. Further, the Stieberger settlement allows the SSA to apply whatever new regulations it has
promulgated to a reopened claim when it renders a decision on
the reopened claim. The SSA may apply regulations such as
those promulgated in 1991 and upheld in Schisler III in
1993,220 even if those regulations override a Second Circuit
decision. When the SSA is allowed to apply a regulation promulgated after the claim was initially decided to a reopened
claim, it is engaging in retroactive rulemaking.22 ' Since
Stiebergerwas brought to enjoin agency nonacquiescence in the
treating physician rule, allowing the SSA to give retroactive
effect to new regulations represents a substantial concession.

Butts, in fact, dealt with the complex case of statutory retroactivity. Id. at 140411; Odorizzi v. Sullivan, 841 F. Supp. 72, 76 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Since the Supreme
Court in Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. at 208, denied retroactivity to administrative rulemaking, the only way that the regulations at issue in Schisler could be
applied retroactively is under the theory that the Second Circuit, in finally validating the regulations, established a new rule that as case law, could then be applied
retroactively. See Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 538 (rules established in a judicial decision are to be applied retroactively).
219 The ultimate rewards of nonacquiescence may be seen by analyzing nonacquiescence as a temporal analogue of forum shopping. Here, the SSA, dissatisfied
with Second Circuit disability precedents, refuses to follow them until they are
changed.
A particularly poignant example occurred in Odorizzi. Here, the court was
faced with applying the regulations validated in Schisler III even though the older
treating physician rule and not the regulations were in effect when the claimant
had his hearing. 841 F. Supp. at 76. Sensitive to the ramifications of this problem, the court admitted that it was "in the awkward position of applying the new
regulations retroactively to this appeal." Id.
'o See supra notes 185-204 and accompanying text.
221 See supra notes 215-19.
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3. The Effect of a District Court Remand on a Stieberger
Reopening
Under the Stieberger settlement, a class member entitled
to a reopening who has a civil action pending in district court
or the Second Circuit may elect to remand his or her case to
the SSA to receive a reopening.2 The disadvantage to claimants whose reopened claims are determined by a de novo standard of review and adjudicated by the retroactive application of
a regulation, is especially clear in the context of a remand from
a district or appellate court to the SSA.
The disability claim of a litigant who agrees to a remand
is reopened at the second, or reconsideration, level of administrative review.223 A claimant who is denied at the reconsideration level must proceed once again through the remaining two
administrative levels-the AU hearing and Appeals Council
review-before again seeking judicial review.
In district court a litigant must show that proof of his or
her disability is based on substantial evidence and, concomitantly, that the SSA's denial was not based on substantial
evidence.224 On remand to the SSA, under the de novo standard of review, a claimant's application is susceptible to denial
on both factual and legal grounds.22 Most significantly, the
" Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1385 (91 10(b)). For a discussion of the
remand procedure, see supra note 104 and accompanying text. A class member
with a pending civil action who does not stipulate to a remand waives all relief
under the settlement. Id. at 1385 (91 10(b)(2)).
22 Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1385-87 (Q110(b)(1), (e)(3)). The four
levels of administrative review are (1) the initial application, (2) a request for
reconsideration, (3) an ALJ hearing, and (4) an Appeals Council review. For a discussion of the SSA's administrative review process, see supra note 4.
In addition, there is a current disagreement between the SSA and class counsel over whether a remand to the Secretary dismisses the district court case, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988) (sentence 4), or whether the district court retains jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988) (sentence 6). See Laforest
Letter, supra note 7; Udell Letter, supra note 7. This remand procedure assumes,
of course, that the remanded claim is actually reopened by the Secretary, an assumption susceptible to challenge. For a discussion of this problem, see supra
notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
224 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988). District courts, exercising judicial review
of final
decisions by the SSA denying disability benefits, apply the substantial evidence
standard of review and do not review the decisions de novo. See Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (the substantial evidence standard of review in Social
Security cases is appropriate).
22.There are occasions, however, where de novo review by a SSA adjudicator
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settlement limits retroactive benefits to a maximum of four
years. Therefore, there is a strong disincentive to agree to a
remand." 6
For example, if in 1994 a litigant in district court alleges
that her disability began in 1988 and continues, but that her
claim was denied at the ALJ hearing (or Appeals Council) level
of administrative review in 1991, she qualifies as a Stieberger
class member.2 27 If she declines the remand to the SSA for a
reopening and wins in district court, her case may be remanded to the SSA for the calculation of benefits, including six
years of retroactive benefits. If she chooses a Stieberger remand, however, her district court case would be dismissed2 2
and her claim reopened at the reconsideration level of administrative review.2 29 Even if she wins at this level, her total retroactive benefits would be limited to four years, causing her to
lose two years of benefits. If she loses at the reconsideration
level, but wins at the subsequent hearing or Appeals Council
levels, she is not entitled to any additional retroactive benefits
despite the SSA's delay. In sum, the clock runs against her in
any scenario under which she agrees to take a Stieberger remand." °

may be preferable to the substantial evidence standard applicable under judicial
review. A district court will not, with few exceptions, allow the introduction of
evidence not first made available to SSA adjudicators. 42 U.S.C. § 404 (1988). For
example, a claimant, whose initial denial was based on an undeveloped record and
who now possesses new medical evidence, may prefer a remand under the
Stieberger settlement to ensure that this evidence is considered.
22 Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. 1387 (T 10(e)(4)). For a discussion of this
four-year period, see supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
' Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1387 (% 8(c)(ii)). This hypothetical
assumes that the claimant applied for disability benefits in 1989.
22 See supra note 223.
22 Stieberger Settlement,

792 F. Supp. at 1385-87 (1 10(b)(1), (e)(3)). The example further assumes that the claimant meets each of the threshold requirements
for a reopening, discussed supra at notes 103-06 and accompanying text, and that
her claim is in fact reopened by the SSA without delay.
' In comparison, retroactive benefits during administrative review not pursuant
to the Stieberger settlement and judicial review continue to accrue. The clock runs
against the SSA if the claimant ultimately wins (and proves that she was disabled
from the initial period she alleged). The only exception under the Stieberger settlement is the provision concerning the payment of full retroactive benefits to several
named plaintiffs, including Ms. Stieberger. Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at
1391-92 (9 21).
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4. The Effect of SSRs and the Manual on ALJ Application
of Second Circuit Holdings
The Stieberger settlement creates a Manual of Second
Circuit Disability Decisions and requires that it be distributed
to all SSA adjudicators."' The Manual contains abstracts of
selected Second Circuit disability decisions issued before the
date of the Settlement.2 At its option, the SSA may, issue
instructions concerning additional Second Circuit disability
decisions that were issued before the settlement.'
Further,
the SSA must maintain a volume of Second Circuit disability
decisions released after the date of the Settlement, and must
ensure that copies are available to each adjudicator. 4 The
SSA also must update the Manual by instructing its adjudicators to follow the new holdings.3
These provisions represent one response to the SSA's perceived lack of educational support of its adjudicators. In particular, these provisions aim to compensate for the SSA's refusal
to instruct its adjudicators to cite to Second Circuit case
law.2 36 The SSA exacerbated the problems created by its policy of nonacquiescence by deliberately withholding Second Cir-

,' Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1379 (Q 4(b)). Paragraph 4(b) provides
that:
SSA shall provide a Manual of Second Circuit Disability Decisions ("Manual") to all decisionmakers and reviewers of decisions. The Manual shall
contain statements of the principal holdings of Second Circuit disability
decisions issued before the date of settlement. The Manual need not
describe each Second Circuit disability decision issued before the date of
settlement but must state principal holdings that address whether an
individual or individuals is or are disabled ... or the procedures and
standards for making such determinations.
Id. The Manual is a 37-page typewritten document excerpting disability holdings
of the Second Circuit issued since June 18, 1992. Manual, supra note 13, at ii. It
contains abstracts concerning 19 separate disability issues, and is subdivided into
specific issues. In addition, it contains cross-references to SSRs, regulations, internal memoranda and computerized instructions.
"2 Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1379 (Q 4(b)); Manual, supra note 13,
at ii.
' Stieberger Settlement, 792 F. Supp. at 1379 (% 4(d)).
234 Id. at 1379 (T] 5(a)).
2 Id. at 1379 (T] 5(b)).
" For example, the Second Circuit, in Schisler 1I, recognized that "the volume
of litigation implicating the [treating physician] rule made it clear" that SSA adjudicators "had no clue that the treating physician rule was the Secretary's established policy." Schisler 11, 851 F.2d at 44.
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cuit decisions from its adjudicators.237 This created a legacy
of nonacquiescence resulting in the failure to educate SSA
adjudicators in Second Circuit case law and a lack of communication to remedy the perceived problems.
The Stieberger settlement and the Manual attempts to
irradicate these problems. An important result of the settlement is that for the first time the SSA is required to provide
specific instructions to its adjudicators, and to update these
instructions to conform to changes in Second Circuit case law.
The Manual provides basic guidance in the meaning of stare
decisis-for example, by differentiating a holding from dicta."' Neither the Settlement nor the Manual, however, completely ensure that adjudicators will properly apply Second
Circuit holdings in the future. The risk of continued
nonacquiescence is particularly acute when the Second Circuit
issues a ruling adverse to the SSA, because adjudicators must
apply whatever instructions are contained in the SSR that
reports the decision. If the SSA issues an SSR instructing its
adjudicators to apply a Second Circuit holding in a manner
that differs from the court's holding, the adjudicator must
follow the instruction, not the holding." 9

See Stieberger III, 738 F. Supp. at 736:
[U]ntil enjoined by this Court [the] SSA had never articulated the treating physician rule as its policy in any of the media through which it
establishes its policies and communicates them to adjudicators . . . . At
various times and at different levels of the administrative review process,
Second Circuit decisions were not circulated to adjudicators. .... In addition, except in response to this Court's decision in Stieberger, SSA adjudicators have not even been told that they must apply the holdings articulated by the Second Circuit.
Id.
I2 Manual, supra note 13, at iii. In
section B., "How to Apply Holdings,"
the
Manual advises:
In general, a holding in a decision is a legal principle that is the basis
of the court's decision on any issue in the case. There may be more than
one holding in a decision. A holding must be applied whenever the legal
principle is relevant.
Not all of the discussion in a decision is a holding. For example, the
factual discussion in a holding in not a holding although it can help you
understand the holding by placing it in context. Also, in their decisions
courts may make observations or other remarks that are helpful in understanding the court's reasoning. You are required to apply the holdings,
not those observations or other comments of the court.
Id.
239 SSRs constitute instructions to adjudicators on a general issue. For example,
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Unfortunately, the Stieberger settlement also does not
allow ALJ's to receive guidance from the Appeals Council at
the hearing level unless a decision is on remand. The decisions
rendered by the Appeals Council often hinge on interpretations
of law, SSRs and regulations, and are rarely published in their
entirety or made available to SSA adjudicators.24 Therefore,

SSR 88-13 provides detailed guidance on how an ALJ should proceed when a
claimant alleges disabling pain; SSR 83-10 instructs ALJs how to decide whether a
claimant is capable of the full range of sedentary employment; and SSR 9 3 -2 p
concerns the evaluation procedure for claimants with HIV infection. In contrast, an
Acquiescence Ruling ("AR") reports a specific court decision and instructs adjudicators on how they are to follow it. These ARs are binding on SSA adjudicators
pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 422.406(b)(2) (1993). See, e.g., AR 93-6(8) (reporting
Brewster ex rel. Keller v. Sullivan, 972 F.2d 898 (8th Cir. 1992), and providing interpretation of the SSA's regulations regarding the presumption of death).
These instructions may differ from the holding itself, or from the way an
individual AU might have applied the holding absent the instruction. The Manual
addressed this problem in its initial instructions:
While SSA will take the steps described above to help you apply Second
Circuit holdings, you must apply the holdings even in the absence of an
instruction, and even if they are not included in the Manual.
Example: You have become aware of a Second Circuit disability
decision (for example, a claimant draws it to your attention or you receive notification of it from SSA), but you have not yet received an instruction from SSA on how to apply the decision and it is not in the
Manual. You must apply the holding(s) of that decision to all claims
where it is relevant.
Manual, supra note 13, at iv. The Stieberger settlement does not address this
contingency. Moreover, this instruction does not apply where the SSA issues a
conflicting instruction.
2. A few Appeals Council decisions are published as SSRs and, as such, are
binding on SSA adjudicators. 20 C.F.R. § 422.406(b)(1) provides that "Social Security Rulings are published in the Federal Register under the authority of the Commissioner of Social Security and are binding on all components of the Administration. These rulings represent precedent final opinions and orders and statements of
policy and interpretations that have been adopted by the Administration." See, e.g.,
SSR 90-4a (reporting Appeals Council decision regarding value of lodging in computing unearned income for Supplemental Security Income purpose). Since the vast
majority of all Appeals Council decisions, as well as decisions rendered at the
hearing level by AU's, are not published as SSRs, they have no precedential authority. Indeed, these decisions remain unknown to other adjudicators, other
claimants and their legal representatives, and the public. One very limited exception is that a handful of Appeals Council and AU decisions are made available to
members of the Social Security bar, through advertisements placed in Social Security Forum, a newsletter published by the National Organization of Social Security
Claimants' Representatives. See, e.g., 15 Soc. SEC. FORUM (Nat'l Org. of Soc. Sec.
Claimants' Representatives), June 1993, at 15. A few Appeals Council decisions are
abstracted in pamphlets published with the Social Security Reporting service, but
are not included in the permanent volumes. The decisions of the ALJ and Appeals
Council concerning an individual claimant are sent to the claimant, and her coun-
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an AL whose determination of an individual disability claim
might have been altered by applying an earlier relevant Appeals Council decision has no opportunity to apply this decision
unless the Appeals Council decision is reported in a SSR. Instead, if the AU denies benefits and the claimant appeals, the
Appeals Council may vacate the determination and remand to
the AI. 2 4' These procedures effectively prevent ALJs from
educating themselves in relevant holdings of the Appeals
Council. Furthermore, they may force claimants to incur needless delay to ensure the proper adjudication of their cases.
These limitations impede ALJs from enjoying the freedom
to act as judges, a position that assumes a degree of independence of thought tempered by the requirement to adhere to
previous decisions rendered by a higher court. Instead AI's
will continue to share" some of the attributes associated with
an agency bureaucrat.24 2 To be sure, the ability of the SSA to
instruct ALJs on agency policies is crucial to their role as principal factfinder. Similarly, the SSA is best suited to educate its
adjudicators. But the lack of a systematic body of Appeals
Council precedent further restricts the effectiveness of the
Stieberger settlement in transforming SSA decisionmaking.
A failure to resolve the issue of public availability of final
decisions of the SSA further hampers the settlement.24 3 The
SSA issues thousands of final decisions annually at each of the

sel if applicable.
241 20 C.F.R. § 404.977(a) (1993).
242 ALJs are assured of a measure of independence by several related provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 1305 (1988) (prescribing the
duties of the Office of Personnel Management and the Merit Systems Protection
Board); 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (appointment); 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (entitling ALJs to pay,

independent of agency ratings); 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (removal by the Merit Systems
Protection Board only for good cause shown after an opportunity for a hearing).
See generally Association of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132
(D.D.C. 1984) (discussing challenge to ALJ independence by the Bellmon Review
program).
243 Final decisions of the SSA may be unappealed decisions rendered at each of
the three levels of administrative review-initial application, reconsideration, and
hearing-and decisions by the Appeals Council, whether or not appealed to the
district court.
The intent of this section is not to criticize the Stieberger settlement for failing to resolve this problem, since the litigation surrounding the settlement did not
involve public availability of the SSA's final decisions. Rather, this issue is introduced to demonstrate that issues crucial to ensuring SSA acquiescence remain

unaffected by the Stieberger litigation and settlement.
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four levels of administrative review. Decisions of the Appeals
Council concerning substantive issues of Social Security law
are of particular concern. To a lesser extent, the limited availability of AUJ determinations are troublesome.' Currently,
final decisions of the SSA are not all published or otherwise
indexed and made available to the public.24 The result is
that claimants, their legal representatives, and others are
denied a crucial tool in challenging individual decisions by
ALJs and the Appeals Council.
The SSA's statutory duty under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") to make its final decisions available to the
public is clear.24 The FOIA mandates that each agency
"make available for public inspection and copying" all final
opinions and orders, except those that are published and offered for sale.247 The Act also requires each agency to maintain and publish an index of "identifying information" concerning each final decision or order.24 This index must be pub-

The Appeals Council, and to some extent determinations by ALJs, are more
often based on questions of law, or mixed questions of law and fact, than decisions
rendered at the initial application and reconsideration levels, which are most often
grounded in factual determinations.
24 This practice represents a violation of the Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1988) [hereinafter FOIA].
246 FOIA § 552(a)(2). Subsection 2 of the FOIA
states:
Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for
public inspection and copying(A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions,
made in the adjudication of cases;
(B) those statements of policy and interpretation which have been
adopted by the agency and are not published in the Federal Register; and
(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that
affect a member of the public;
unless the materials are promptly published and copies offered for sale.
To the extent required to prevent a clearly'unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, an agency may delete identifying details when it makes
available or publishes an opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or
staff manual or instruction. However, in each case the justification for
the deletion shall be explained fully in writing.
244

Id.

247

Id. § 552(a)(2).
5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2). The indexing provision of the Act states:
Each agency shall also maintain and make available for public inspection
and copying current indexes providing identifying information to the public as to any matter issued, adopted, or promulgated after July 4, 1967,
and required by this paragraph to me made available or published. Each
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lished at least quarterly and must be distributed to the public.
If publication is impracticable the index still must be prepared
and offered for sale to the public at cost.2 49 Moreover, none of
the FOTA's nine exemptions apply to the publishing and indexing of the SSA's final opinions."'

Id.

agency shall promptly publish, quarterly or more frequently, and distribute (by sale or otherwise) copies of each index or supplements thereto
unless it determines by order published in the Federal Register that the
publication would be unnecessary and impracticable, in which case the
agency shall nonetheless provide copies of such request at a cost not to
exceed the direct cost of duplication.
249

Id.

2"0The FOIA exempts nine matters from its publication and indexing requirements: (1) issues classified as secret by an Executive Order; (2) issues related to
an agency's internal personnel rules and procedures; (3) certain issues exempted
from disclosure by a statute; (4) trade secrets and privileged commercial or financial information; (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters which
would not be available to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency; (6) personnel and medical files in which disclosure would constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (7) investigatory records compiled for
law enforcement purposes; (8) reports by agencies responsible for the supervision
of financial institutions; and (9) geological and geophysical information. 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(1)-(9) (1988).
Of these exemptions, the only one that could conceivably apply to the SSA's
opinions is six, which involves medical files. AUJ disability decisions state and rely
on each claimant's personal medical information, including the names and opinions
of physicians, and laboratory tests. Claimants who have terminal conditions are
identified, including, for example, those with AIDS. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5
U.S.C. § 552a (1988), creates certain legal protections of individual privacy, especially in the context of the release of information to third parties. Thus, the SSA
could argue that its opinions disclose personal information, and as a result, the
SSA is prohibited from publishing under the Privacy Act and exempt from the

FOIA.
There are four reasons why this argument fails. First, the names of individual
claimants in ALJ and Appeals Council decisions may be omitted and replaced with
an identifying number (such as AC 94-10 for the tenth decision rendered by the
Appeals Council in 1994) without unduly compromising the privacy of claimants.
The SSA already reports a few Appeals Council decisions in SSRs each year by
omitting the name of the claimant. See, e.g., SSR 90-4a, discussed supra at note
263.
Second, the Privacy Act does not apply when, as here, records concerning
individuals are required to be disclosed under the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2)
(exempting prohibition against agency disclosure of records to any person or another agency when the disclosure is required under § 552). These determinations are
final decisions of the SSA and are required to be disclosed. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A).
Moreover, many other agencies report all of their final decisions in unredacted
form.
Third, when a claimant appeals a final decision of the SSA in district court,
the court's decision includes the claimant's name and copious medical information.
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In an important recent case, the Supreme Court, in NLRB
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,25' held that Appeals Memoranda
that explained the Office of the General Counsel's decision not
to file a complaint with the NLRB were final opinions made in
the adjudication of cases and must be disclosed and indexed
pursuant to the FOIA.252 As the Court strongly noted:
This conclusion is powerfully supported by the other provisions of
the Act. The affirmative portion of the Act, expressly requiring indexing of "final opinions," "statements of policy and interpretations
which have been adopted by the agency," and "instructions to staff
that affect a member of the public," represents a strong congressional aversion to "secret law," and represents an affirmative congressional purpose to require disclosure of documents that have "the
force and effect of law."253

The SSA has attempted to circumvent the FOIA's unambiguously stated intent that all agency final opinions be made
available for public inspection254 by issuing a selected number
of final opinions in SSRs. These SSRs are available for purchase and may be inspected at district and branch offices,255
but SSA has failed to either issue all final opinions as SSRs or
The medical data concerning Ms. Stieberger herself is an example of the ready
availability of this information. Fourth, the public interest in disclosure-at least
of a partially redacted decision--outweighs the interest in privacy. Public availability of these final decisions will be of great benefit not only to future claimants,
who may avoid a denial of benefits or delay by applying SSA case law, but also to
the SSA itself, which may develop and maintain a body of case law by allowing
its adjudicators access to all of it.
251

421 U.S. 132 (1975).

252 Id.

at 157-59. The Court determined that Appeals Memoranda, which directed the filing of a complaint with the NLRB, fell within the fifth exemption and
were thus non-disclosable as "predecisional communications." Id. at 153-54. The
SSA has applied Sears, Roebuck to distinguish the predecisional communications of
the ALT hearing process and Appeals Council review from final decisions rendered
from either source.
The AUJ hearing process and the A[ppeals] C[ouncil] review are both
deliberative processes which result in final agency decisions. An ALJ's

decision on a claim becomes final if the AC does not review the decision.
When the AC does accept a case for review, its decision becomes the
agency's final decision.
SSR 92-1p.
21 Sears, Roebuck, 421 U.S. at 153 (citations omitted).
254 See supra note 246.
25 SSRs may be purchased

through the Government Printing Office. 20 C.F.R. §
422.406(a)(4) (1993); 20 C.F.R. § 422.410(d) (1990). Each SSR is also published in
the Federal Register. 20 C.F.R. § 422.406(b) (1993). SSRs may be inspected at
district and branch offices, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 422.430(a)(4) (1993).
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publish them in the Federal Register. Moreover, despite averments to the contrary, the SSA does not index final opinions
either in SSRs or elsewhere, as the FOIA requires." 6 The result is that, most of the time, a final opinion rendered by SSA
adjudicators is not available in any form to anyone (including
other SSA adjudicators) besides the specific case's claimant.
The SSA's practice of withholding final decisions places it
in the minority among executive agencies. Many other agencies
publish their final opinions in official reporters and provide
cumulative indexes of the opinions."' By joining the practice
of other agencies, the SSA would fulfill the mandate of the
FOIA. In addition, reporting its final decisions would provide
the SSA with a crucial tool to educate its own adjudicators who
could then apply administrative case law to new determinations. While the Stieberger settlement's requirements concerning publication of the Manual and future volumes of Second
Circuit decisions represent an important first step, the
settlement's failure to resolve disputes over administrative
case law significantly limits its ultimate effectiveness.

2s- 20 C.F.R. § 422.406(a) states:

Materials required to be published pursuant to the provisions of 5 U.S.C.
[§J 552a(a)(1) and (a)(2) are published in one of the following ways:
(4) By publication in the "Social Security Rulings" of indexes of
precedential social security orders and opinions issued in the adjudication
of claims, statements of policy and interpretations which have been
adopted but have not been published in the Federal Register, and of
administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member of the public.
Id. It would appear from this regulatory language that the SSA both concedes
that indices of final orders are required and that the SSA publishes them. A review of all SSRs that the SSA alleges it published in 1992 and 1993, reveals that
the SSA has not in fact published these indexes. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.89-8 (1993)
(recommending that agencies index and make publicly available adjudicatory decisions of their highest "tribunals"); 1 C.F.R. § 305.90-4 (1993) (applying this recommendation specifically to the SSA's Appeals Council).
2. These agencies or agency bodies include the Federal Aviation Administration,
the National Transportation Safety Board, the Securities & Exchange Commission,
the National Labor Relations Board, the Employees' Compensation Appeals Board,
the Board of Immigration Appeals, the United States Merit System Protection
Board, and the Office of Hearings and Appeals of the Department of the Interior.
It should be noted that in virtually all cases the name and identifying details of
all parties are disclosed. One exception is the Federal Aviation Administration's
civil penalty decisions concerning security breaches in airports. They do not disclose the identity of the airport.
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Any postmortem of the Stieberger settlement must therefore take into account the current structural weakness of SSA
decisionmaking. Without the flexibility and independence on
the part of ALJs to integrate holdings of the Second Circuit
with specific factual settings, the Stieberger settlement-despite all that it has accomplished-remains something of a
Pyrrhic victory. It is for this reason that transforming the Appeals Council into an Article III Court of Social Security Appeals represents the most effective solution to the practice of
nonacquiescence and its unfortunate legacy of educational
deficiency, excessive bureaucratization and overt politicization.
IV. TRANSFORMING THE APPEALS COUNCIL INTO AN ARTICLE III
COURT OF SOCIAL SECURITY APPEALS

The Stieberger and Schisler litigations, spanning nearly a
decade, have renewed public attention on the structural weaknesses of the SSA's disability adjudication. The SSA differs
fundamentally from other administrative agencies because of
the number of claims it adjudicates, the persons (often disabled, poor, and unrepresented) who stand before it, and the
complex web of statutory law, regulations, rulings, and case
law involved. Decisionmaking at the initial levels of application, reconsideration and hearing is based primarily on factual
determinations made in accordance with applicable regulations, rulings, and the Social Security Act."'
Review by the Appeals Council-a twenty-member body
based in Virginia-is based less often on solely factual determinations.259 The Council rarely sits in panels and rarely conducts oral argument, although regulations provide for it."'
Instead, in most cases one member performs a paper review of
the ALJ decision, relying primarily on "boilerplate" language

...For a discussion of the levels of administrative review under the Social Security Act, see supra note 4.
.59The Appeals Council most often exercises summary review, given its huge
caseload. Administrative Conference of the United States ("ACUS"), A New Role
for the Social Security Appeals Council, 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-7 (1993). The ACUS
estimated that the Appeals Council's caseload numbered 50,000 (equaling up to
500 cases per member per month).
260See 20 C.F.R. § 404.976(c) (1993); 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-7.
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rather than original legal analysis.2 6 ' According to the Administrative Conference of the United States ("ACUS"), of the
cases the Council reviews, 5% are reversed and 7% to 15% are
remanded to the AL. 26 2 The remaining 80 to 88% of the cases affirm the AL's denial of benefits to the claimant. 263 Historically, many of these cases have been reversed by the district court.2 '
A number of proposals have been made to respond to the
overwhelming caseload and relative ineffectiveness of the Appeals Council. These proposals have ranged from a reduction in
cases adjudicated by the Appeals Council (by empowering it to
deny a petition for review) to transformation of the Council
into an Article I Court of Social Security Appeals (with judicial
review vested in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
Other proposals have included creation of a centralized ALJ
corps, and outright abolition of the Appeals Council. 265 A
brief review of these proposals demonstrates the need for a
new proposal to transform the current Appeals Council into an
Article III Court of Social Security Appeals.
A. Reducing the Appeals Council's Caseload
Responding to the SSA's request to analyze the operation
of the Appeals Council, the ACUS considered completely abol-

2G' 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-7 (1993).
2C2 Id.
2G3Id.

"' See supra note 44. A district court judge would only have the opportunity to
review the determination of the Appeals Council if the claimant appealed. The
majority of claimants denied at the Appeals Council do not appeal. Statistics issued by the SSA reveal that only 28% of claimants who were denied benefits by
the Appeals Council appealed to district court. Kubitschek, supra note 30, at 637.
20 See 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-7; 1 C.F.R. § 305.92-7 (1993); Rains, supra note 26, at
16-19. For example, the American Council of the United States ("ACUS") stated:
Serious consideration was given to recommending outright abolition of the
Appeals Council. This view was premised on the Appeals Council's present inability to do little more than add one more layer to the alreadylengthy review bureaucracy. (This criticism was not intended as a denigration of Appeals Council members, whom the study found to be competent, dedicated, and cooperative.)" 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-7. The ACUS concluded that if the Appeals Council's performance did not improve pursuant to their recommendations, "serious consideration should be given to
abolishing it."
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ishing the Council as useless additional bureaucracy, but instead opted for "fundamental changes."266 ACUS recommended that the SSA restructure the Appeals Council by empowering it to restrict its caseload through the authority to deny
petitions for review, and focusing on policymaking and decisional standards.267 It asserted that the Appeals Council
would be able to work more collaboratively with a reduced
caseload, and could encourage the submission of briefs and oral
arguments, in order to write "more elaborate" opinions."'
The ACUS further recommended a restriction in the introduction of new evidence at the Appeals Council level, and greater
opportunities for Council reopenings.269 It noted, however,
that if these recommendations did not produce improved results, "serious consideration" should be given to the outright
elimination of the Appeals Council.270 If the SSA had implemented this recommendation, the effect would have been to
reduce the traditional case review function of the Appeals
Council significantly and to replace it with a policy determination purpose. The ACUS, however, did recommend that the
Appeals Council "focus on important issues on which it could
issue precedential opinions."27 '
B. An Article I Court of Social Security Appeals
A number of proposals to create an Article I Court of Social Security Appeals were introduced in Congress or recommended by commentators and the Federal Courts Study Committee.

72

The Social Security Procedural Improvements Act

2- 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-7 (1993).
267 Id.
2G8 Id.

" Id. The ACUS also devoted a substantial portion of its recommendation to
enhancing the status and visibility of the Appeals Council. A subsequent recommendation focused on limiting the evidence available for Appeals Council review to
that presented to the ALJ at the hearing level. ACUS, Social Security Disability
Program Appeals Process: Supplementary Recommendation, 1 C.F.R. § 305.90-4
(1993).
270 1 C.F.R. § 305.87-7 (1993).
27 1 C.F.R. § 305.90-4 (1993).
272 ACUS, Specialized Review of Administrative Action, 1 C.F.R. § 305.91-9
(1993); JERRY MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS (1978);

Rains, supra note 26. The Federal Courts Study Committee was empaneled by
Congress to examine problems facing the courts and to develop plans to address
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of 1986, for example, proposed to abolish the Appeals Council
and replace it with an Article I Social Security Court.273 This
court would consist of twenty judges appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate to serve a term of ten years,
but subject to removal by the President for cause. The proposed statute also would have vested exclusive appellate jurisdiction in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
274
Circuit.
Similarly, the Social Security Reorganization Act of 1986
proposed the establishment of a Social Security Court. Under
this proposal, the ALJ effectively would have been replaced
with a "hearing officer" and the Appeals Council member with
an AJ. 27 5 This proposed statute would have vested appellate
jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
except for claims arising under the Constitution or challenging
a regulation. These claims would be adjudicated by federal
district courts.276
In 1990 the Federal Courts Study Committee empaneled
2 7
The Committee
by Congress issued its recommendationsY.
rejected a proposal to create an Article III court to adjudicate
all Social Security appeals. 8 It did, however, recommend the
creation of an Article I court to review Social Security disability claims.2 7 9 Responding to this proposal, the ACUS recommended that Congress also establish judicial review by an
Article III court for questions of constitutional or statutory
interpretation.8 0
Proponents of an Article I Court of Social Security Appeals
argue that the combination of a large number of cases and the
perceived need for uniformity, technical expertise, and efficien-

these problems. The Committee issued its report in April 1990. 1 C.F.R. §
305.91-9 (1993). For a discussion of the Committee's proposal for an Article I
Court of Social Security Appeals, see infra notes 279-82 and accompanying text.
2" H.R. 4419, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Rains, supra note 26.
274 Rains, supra note 26, at 16-17.
272 Rains, supra note 26, at 17-18;

(1986).
...Rains, supra note 26, at 19.
2"7See 1 C.F.R. §305.91-9 (1993).
278 Id.
279 Id.
" Id. (Recommendation 5(C)).

see also H.R. 4647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
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cy justify its establishment.2 8 ' As one commentator has ar-

gued, however, none of these justifications warrant the creation of an Article I court.282 The twenty judges who would
sit on the proposed court would be just as overwhelmed with
their caseload as the Appeals Council continues to be. In addition, substantial differences among the circuits would not be
resolved by such a court. There is also no evidence that district
court judges lack expertise.283 Most importantly, the creation
of an Article I court might endanger independent judicial review, since these judges would be appointed to a ten-year term
and might be more susceptible to "agency capture" than are
judges with life-tenure." Article I judges would "become, essentially, another set of administrative law judges superimposed over the ALJs who hear the administrative cases."285
Finally, vesting exclusive or residual appellate jurisdiction in
the United States Court for the Federal Circuit would hardly
facilitate expertise or efficiency, since requiring that a claimant
and counsel appear in Washington D.C. would likely cause
extreme hardship to many.286
C. An Article III Court of Social Security Appeals
There are substantial advantages to eliminating the existing Appeals Council and establishing an Article III Court of
Social Security Appeals. First, an Article III Court would have
a more generalized scope than either an Article I Court or the
existing Appeals Council since it would be exposed to a broad
range of related statutory, regulatory and constitutional issues.287 Although SSDI and SSI disability claims would likely
281 See Rains, supra note 26, at 20-22.
2"2 See Rains, supra note 26, at 22.
283 Rains, supra note 26, at 22-29.
284 Rains, supra note 26, at 25-26.

The recent history of the Social Security Administration . . . emphasizes

the critical need for truly independent judicial review. Replacing Article
III lifetime tenure judges with Article I judges hardly advances this independence. Varying the proposed term length of Article I judges may have
some effect on the sense of independence of these judges, but it cannot
provide the independence intended for Article III judges.
Id. at 26.
" Rains, supra note 26, at 26.
28.Rains, supra note 26, at 27-29.
282 See 1 C.F.R. § 305.91-9 (1993).

The ACUS specifically recommended that

1994]

THE POLITICS OF NONACQUIESCENCE

constitute the majority of its caseload, such a court also would
exercise appellate jurisdiction over such related claims as Social Security retirement, Medicare cases and attorney's fee
questions under the Equal Access to Justice Act."' The court
also would exercise original jurisdiction over controversies
concerning rulemaking by the SSA. As part of the federal judiciary, the court would improve the representation of pro se
claimants by the addition of pro se clerks.28 9
Second, nomination of judges by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate,2 90 with lifetime appointment and removal only by impeachment would guarantee expertise and decisional independence. An Article III Court
would be free of excessive politicization resulting from congressional oversight and of the problems that potentially plague an
Article I court, such as the indirect executive branch supervision characteristic of the existing Appeals Council and agency capture. 1
Additionally, the SSA could never use an Article III Court
to nonacquiesce in decisions of federal courts of appeals or to
review the performances of ALJs. The SSA would be prevented
from such troublesome actions because SSRs and SSA memoranda are binding only on SSA personnel. Rather, not only
would an Article III court develop special expertise in adjudicating cases involving highly technical fact patterns and interrelated statutory and regulatory provisions, most significantly
it would develop its own case law, creating binding precedent
for SSA adjudicators and persuasive authority for courts of

"[w]hen review has been assigned to an Article I specialized court, [Congress
should] provide a subsequent layer of judicial review by an Article III court for
questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation." Id.
25 U.S.C. § 504 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1988) brought under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988).
2" Vesting appellate review of decisions rendered by the Court of Social Security Appeals in United States Courts of Appeal, rather than the restricting review
to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, would represent an important advantage to many pro se claimants. See Rains, supra note 26, at 29-30 (arguing
that vesting exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit is illogical and
fundamentally unfair to claimants).
21 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
.9 Although the ACUS recommended that "avoidance of the fact or appearance
of capture by special interests" could best be ensured by diversity of subject matter jurisdiction, 1 C.F.R. § 305.91-9 (1993), only Article III judges retain the independence necessary to avoid such agency capture.
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appeals. 2 By synthesizing agency regulations, case law, and
statutory and constitutional considerations, as the Appeals
Council has never done, an Article III Court would provide
crucial guidance to ALJs and SSA adjudicators at the initial
application and reconsideration levels.293
V. CONCLUSION

While the Stieberger settlement crafted significant relief,
its ultimate reach will be more limited. These substantive
limitations result from the restrictive definition of "nonacquiescence" by the Stieberger court and from the Second Circuit's
excessive deference to the SSA in Schisler III. Four "problems
of implementation," including the reopening and-remand procedures, de novo review and retroactivity, and the absence of any
body of precedent to guide SSA adjudicators will further restrict the practical effectiveness of the Stieberger settlement.
The Stieberger settlement ended the SSA's nonacquiescence in decisions of the Second Circuit. While the practice of
nonacquiescence was eliminated, its powerful legacy continues
to affect the quality of SSA decisionmaking. For example, rather than creating a body of decisional law designed to integrate
Second Circuit holdings and administrative regulations within
specific factual settings, the SSA merely supplies instructional
materials to ALJs in the form of SSRs. Such a practice hardly
succeeds in solving the educational weaknesses and
politicization that remains the most significant legacy of nonacquiescence.
The creation of an Article III Court of Social Security Appeals would provide the specialized expertise and independence
needed to resolve statutory and regulatory questions posed by
the Social Security Act, and to develop a body of precedent.
Replacing the outmoded and unworkable Appeals Council,

2" For a discussion of the problem concerning the Appeals Council's failure to

develop its own case law, see supra notes 243-54 and accompanying text.
' The Court's development of a body of precedent to be followed by all SSA
adjudicators would fulfill an objective identified by the ACUS as early as 1978 but
never implemented. For example, the ACUS recommended that the "Social Security
Administration should devote more attention to the development and dissemination
of precedent materials" including "publication of fact-based precedent decisions." 1
C.F.R. § 305.78-2 (1993).
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would promote the adjudicative consistency and efficiency
characteristic of many other executive agencies-an as yet
elusive goal of the Social Security Administration.
Robert J. Axelrod2 94

294 The author is grateful to Professor Minna Kotkin and Wendy Brill, Esq., for
their criticisms and suggestions of earlier drafts of this Comment, and to Nancy
de Waard Axelrod and Jacob Axelrod for their sacrifices during its germination.

